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Abstract
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How
computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain
amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election’s winner? We
study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson
voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous
electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-
unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both
polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and
indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the
setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation
(by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete
but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of
elections (including plurality, Borda, k-approval, and veto) known as scoring protocols,
we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate
condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.
∗Supported in part by grants NSF-CCR-0311021, NSF-CCF-0426761, and NSF-IIS-0713061, two
Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Awards, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation’s TransCoop
program. Also appears as URCS-TR-2006-895. An early version of this paper, titled “The Complexity of
Bribery in Elections,” appeared in the proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI-06) and was also presented at COMSOC-06 and NESCAI-07.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the complexity of bribery in elections, that is, the complexity of
computing whether it is possible, by modifying the preferences of a given number of voters,
to make some preferred candidate a winner.
Election systems provide a framework for aggregating voters’ preferences—ideally
(though there is no truly ideal voting system [DS00,Gib73,Sat75]) in a way that is satisfying,
attractive, and natural. Societies use elections to select their leaders, establish their laws,
and decide their policies, but practical applications of elections are not restricted to people
and politics. Many parallel algorithms start by electing leaders. Multi-agent systems
sometimes use voting for the purpose of planning [ER97]. Web search engines can aggregate
results using methods based on elections [DKNS01]. With such a wide range of applications,
it is not surprising that elections vary tremendously. For example, one might think at first
that typical elections have many voters and very few candidates. However, in fact, they may
have a very wide range of voter-to-candidate proportions: In typical presidential elections
there are relatively few candidates but there may be millions of voters. In the context of
the web, one may consider web pages as voting on other pages by linking to them, or may
consider humans to be voting on pages at a site by the time they spend on each. In such a
setting we may have both a large number of voters and a large number of candidates. On
the other hand, Dwork et al. [DKNS01] suggest designing a meta search engine that treats
other search engines as voters and web pages as candidates. This yields very few voters but
many candidates.
With the principles of democracy in mind, we also tend to think that each vote is equally
important. However, all the above scenarios make just as much sense in a setting in which
each voter has a different voting power. For example, U.S. presidential elections are in
some sense weighted (different states have different voting powers in the Electoral College);
shareholders in a company have votes weighted by the number of shares they own; and
search engines in the above example could be weighted by their quality. Weighted voting is
a natural choice in many other settings as well.
The importance of election systems naturally inspired questions regarding their
resistance to abuse, and several potential dangers were identified and studied. For example,
an election’s organizers can make attempts to control the outcome of the elections by
procedural tricks such as adding or deleting candidates or encouraging/discouraging people
from voting. Classical social choice theory is concerned with the possibility or impossibility
of such procedural control. However, recently it was realized that even if control is possible,
it may still be difficult to find what actions are needed to effect control, e.g., because
the computational problem is NP-complete. The complexity of controlling who wins the
election was studied first by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] and later on by many
other authors [PRZ06,FHHR07,HHR07a,ENR08a,ENR08b,FHHR08,MPR08]. Elections
are endangered not only by the organizers but also by the voters (manipulation), who
might be tempted to vote strategically (that is, not according to their true preferences)
to obtain their preferred outcome. This is not desirable as it can skew the result of the
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elections in a way that is arguably not in the best interest of the society. The Gibbard–
Satterthwaite/Duggan–Schwartz Theorems [Gib73,Sat75,DS00] show that essentially all
election systems can be manipulated, and so it is important to discover for which systems
manipulation is computationally difficult to execute. This line of research was started by
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] and was continued by many researchers (as a few
varied examples, we mention [EL05b,EL05a,CSL07,HH07,PR07,BFH+08,FHS08,ZPR08];
readers interested in manipulation will be able to reach a broader collection of papers
through the standard process of recursive bibliography search.)
Surprisingly, nobody seems to have addressed the issue of (the complexity of) bribery,
i.e., attacks where the person interested in the success of a particular candidate picks a group
of voters and convinces them to vote as he or she says. Bribery seems strongly motivated
both from real life and from computational agent-based settings, and shares some of the
flavor of both manipulation (changing voters’ (reported) preferences) and control (deciding
which voters to influence). This paper initiates the study of the complexity of bribery in
elections.
There are many different settings in which bribery can be studied. In the simplest one
we are interested only in the least number of voters we need to bribe to make our favored
candidate win. A natural extension is to consider prices for each voter. In this setting,
each voter is willing to change his or her true preferences to anything we say, but only if
we can meet his or her price. In an even more complicated setting it is conceivable that
voters would have different prices depending on how we want to affect their vote (however,
it is not clear how to succinctly encode a voter’s price scheme). We mainly focus on the
previous two scenarios but we do point the reader to our results on approval voting and
to the paper of Faliszewski [Fal08] for a discussion of bribery when prices are represented
more flexibly.
We classify election systems with respect to bribery by in each case seeking to either (a)
prove the complexity is low by giving a polynomial-time algorithm or (b) argue intractability
via proving the NP-completeness of discovering whether bribery can affect a given case. We
obtain a broad range of results showing that the complexity of bribery depends closely on
the setting. For example, for weighted plurality elections bribery is in P but jumps to
being NP-complete if voters have price tags. As another example, for approval voting the
manipulation problem is easily seen to be in P, but in contrast we prove that the bribery
problem is NP-complete. Yet we also prove that when the bribery cost function is made
more local, the complexity of approval voting falls back to P. For scoring protocols we
obtain complete characterizations of the complexity of bribery for all possible voter types,
i.e., with and without weights and with and without price tags. In particular, via dichotomy
theorems and algorithmic constructions we for each voter type provide a simple condition
that partitions all scoring protocols into ones with NP-complete bribery problems and ones
with P bribery problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the election systems and
bribery problems we are interested in and we cover some complexity background and
preliminaries. In Section 3, we provide a detailed study of plurality elections. After that
3
we study connections between manipulation and bribery, and obtain dichotomy results for
bribery under scoring protocols in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the case of succinctly
represented elections with a fixed number of candidates.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Election systems
We can describe elections by providing a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates, a set V of n
voters specified by their preferences, and a rule for selecting winners. A voter v’s preferences
are represented as a list ci1 > ci2 > . . . > cim , {i1, i2, . . . , im} = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, where ci1 is
the most preferred candidate and cim is the most despised one. We assume that preferences
are transitive, complete (for every two candidates each voter knows which one he or she
prefers), and strict (no ties). Sometimes authors also allow ties in the preference lists, but
ties do not have a clear interpretation for some election rules and so for simplicity and
uniformity we do not consider them.
Given a list of votes (i.e., of voters’ preference lists), an election rule determines which
candidates are winners of the elections. We now briefly describe the election systems that
we analyze in this paper, all of which are standard in the literature on social choice theory.1
Winners of plurality elections are the candidate(s) who are the top choice of the largest
number of voters (of course, these will be different voters for different winners). In approval
voting each voter selects candidates he approves of; the candidate(s) with the most approvals
win. Unlike all the other systems discussed in this paper, under approval voting the input
is not a preference order but rather is a bit-vector of approvals/disapprovals. A scoring
protocol for m candidates is described by a vector α = (α1, . . . , αm) of nonnegative integers
such that α1 ≥ α2 . . . ≥ αm. (We have not required α1 > αm, as we wish to classify the
broadest class of cases possible, including the usually easy boundary case when all αi’s are
equal.) Each time a candidate appears in the i’th position of a voter’s preference list, that
candidate gets αi points; the candidate(s) who receive the most points win. Well-known
examples of scoring protocols include the Borda count, plurality, k-approval, and veto voting
systems, where for m-candidate elections Borda uses α = (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0), plurality
uses α = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0), k-approval uses (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
m−k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), and veto uses α = (1, 1, . . .
, 1, 0). Note that by selecting a scoring protocol we automatically select the number of
candidates we have within elections. Though some scoring protocols can easily and naturally
be generalized to arbitrary candidate sets, formally each individual scoring protocol deals
with only a fixed number of candidates. Thus all our results regarding scoring protocols
1In the social choice literature, often voting systems are assumed to have at least one winner, or exactly
one winner, but at least in terms of the notion of voting system, do not require such a restriction, since one
can imagine wanting to study elections in which—perhaps due to tie effects or symmetry effects (or even due
to having zero candidates)—there is not always exactly one winner. Indeed, in practice, in such elections as
those on Hall of Fame induction worthiness or on who should be hired at a given academic department, it
is quite possible that a real-world election system might give the answer “No one this year.”
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automatically talk about a fixed number of candidates.
A Condorcet winner is a candidate who (strictly) beats all other candidates in pairwise
contests, that is, a Condorcet winner beats everyone else in pairwise plurality elections.
Clearly, there can be at most one Condorcet winner, but sometimes there are none (as is
the case in the Condorcet Paradox [Con85]). There are many voting systems that choose the
Condorcet winner if one exists and use some compatible rule otherwise. One such system—
developed in the 1800s—is that of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (a.k.a. Lewis Carroll). In
Dodgson’s system a winner is the person(s) who can become a Condorcet winner by the
smallest number of switches in voters’ preference lists. (A switch changes the order of
two adjacent candidates on a list.2) Thus, if a Condorcet winner exists, he or she is also
the unique winner of Dodgson’s election. See Dodgson [Dod76]—and also [BTT89b]—for
details regarding Dodgson’s voting rule, under which it is now known that winner testing
is complete for parallel access to NP ([HHR97], see also [SV00]). A different election rule
was introduced by Young in the 1970s [You77]. In Young elections a winner is a person
who can become a Condorcet winner by removing the smallest number of voters. By way
of contrast, note that plurality rule has the property that it elects those candidates who,
after removing the least number of votes, are preferred by everyone. The work of Rothe,
Spakowski, and Vogel ([RSV03], see also the expository presentation in [Rot05]) proves that
the winner problem in Young elections is extremely difficult—complete for parallel access
to NP.
Another election rule is that of Kemeny [Kem59,KS60]: A Kemeny consensus is a
preference order that maximizes the number of agreements with voters’ preference lists,
where for each voter and for each two candidates a and b we say that a preference order
agrees with a voter’s preference list if both place a below b or both place b below a. Naturally,
many different Kemeny consensuses may be possible. A candidate is a winner in a Kemeny
election if he or she is the most preferred candidate in some Kemeny consensus of that
election. (The original work of Kemeny allowed voters to have nonstrict preference orders,
but like, e.g., [SM00], we use Kemeny elections to refer to just the case where input orderings
are strict.) Note that the winner testing problem for Kemeny elections is known to be
complete for parallel access to NP, and this is known to hold both in the case when input
preference orders must be strict, and in the case when nonstrict input preference orders
are allowed ([HSV05], and see in particular the comments in footnote 2 of that paper).
The Kemeny rule might at first sound as if it were the same as the Dodgson rule, but
in fact they are very different. Dodgson’s elections are based on making the minimum
number of local changes, but Kemeny’s elections hinge on the overall closeness of the voters’
preference orders to certain “consensus” orderings—which themselves possibly may not be
the preferences of any of the voters.
2We mention, since this can be a source of confusion, that in his seminal paper Dodgson did not explicitly
state that switches were limited to adjacent candidates. However, the mathematics of his examples are
consistent with only that reading, and so it is clear that that is his intended meaning.
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2.2 Bribery Problems
Informally, the bribery problem is the following: Given the description of an election (i.e.,
the set of candidates, the preferences of the voters, etc.), a number k, and some distinguished
candidate p, can we make p a winner by changing the preference lists of at most k voters.
More formally, for an election rule (i.e., election system) E we define the E-bribery problem
to be the following. We assume a standard encoding of mathematical objects such as finite
sets and lists (see, e.g., [GJ79]). Also, all our numbers will be nonnegative integers and,
unless otherwise specified, will be represented in binary.
Name: E-bribery.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via their preference lists.
A distinguished candidate p ∈ C and a nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is it possible to make p a winner of the E election by changing the preference
lists of at most k voters?
We will speak both of the unweighted case (all voters are equal; in this paper that always
holds unless “weighted” is in the problem name) and the weighted case (voters are weighted).
Essentially all our results apply both to the case in which we want to make the preferred
candidate a winner and to the case in which we want to make the preferred candidate
the unique winner, and so we have not explicitly put a nonunique/unique setting into the
problem names. For clarity and specificity, we focus on the nonunique case in our discussions
and proofs, and all our problem statements and theorems by default refer to the nonunique
case. However, in most settings the differences between the proofs for the unique case and
the nonunique case are very minor and amount to a couple of small tweaks, e.g., changing
weak inequalities to strong ones, adding a special voter who already prefers p, etc., and we
often at the end of a proof briefly note that the theorem also holds for the unique case.
In the E-$bribery family of problems we assume that each voter has a price for changing
his or her preference list. In such a case we ask not whether we can bribe at most k people,
but whether we can make p a winner by spending at most k dollars. For example, the
plurality-weighted-$bribery problem can be described as follows.
Name: plurality-weighted-$bribery.
Given: A set C of candidates. A collection V of voters specified via their preference
lists (prefs1, . . . , prefsm), their (nonnegative, integer) weights (w1, . . . , wm), and their
(nonnegative, integer) prices (p1, . . . , pm). A distinguished candidate p ∈ C and a
nonnegative integer k (which we will sometimes refer to as the budget).
Question: Is there a set B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that
∑
i∈B pi ≤ k and there is a way to bribe
the voters from B in such a way that p becomes a winner?
Regarding the fact that in these models voters are assumed to vote as the bribes dictate,
we stress that by using the term bribery we do not intend to necessarily imply any moral
failure on the part of bribe recipients: Bribes are simply payments.
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Throughout this paper we use the term bribery both in its regular sense and in the
nonstandard sense of “a collection of bribes.” We will when using the latter sense often
speak of “a bribery,” by which we thus mean a collection of bribes.
As we will be dealing with a variety of settings, we need some common format to speak
of the instances of bribery problems. We adopt the following convention (and we view the
already specified problems to be implicitly recast into this form): An instance of a bribery
problem is a 4-tuple E = (C, V, p, k), where
1. C is a list of candidates,
2. V is a list of voters (see below),
3. p ∈ C is the candidate that we want to make a winner (for problems about making a
candidate a unique winner, the “a winner” here is replaced with “a unique winner”),
and
4. k is the bribe limit (either the amount of money we can spend on bribing or the
maximum number of voters we can bribe, depending on the flavor of the bribery
problem).
The list of voters contains tuples describing the votes that are cast. Each voter is a 3-tuple
(prefs , π, ω), where
1. prefs is the preference list of the voter (or is the preference vector in the case of
approval voting),
2. π is the price for changing this voter’s preference list, and
3. ω is the weight of the voter.
Each tuple in V describes precisely one voter. We drop the price and/or the weight field
if in the given election the voters have no prices/weights. (However, we do assume that
dropped prices and weights have unit values, so that we can refer to them. Some of our
proofs handle two cases, one with priced voters and one with weighted voters, at the same
time and need to be able to uniformly refer to both weights and prices.) If v ∈ V is a voter
then we refer to his or her price and weight as π(v) and ω(v). In the same manner, if U ⊆ V
then
π(U) =
∑
v∈U
π(v) and
ω(U) =
∑
v∈U
ω(v).
We will often refer to ω(U) either as “the vote weight of U” or as “the total weight of U .”
Note that throughout this paper V , though input as a list, typically functions as
a multiset, and so summations such as those above do have an additive term for
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each appropriate occurrence in the multiset—the multiplicities carry into such sums,
and also into set-like operations, e.g., {v ∈ V | . . .} will itself be a multiset, with
multiplicities appropriately preserved. And we when dealing with V use set/subset to
mean multiset/submultiset.
In Section 5 we deal with succinct representations. When we are dealing with succinct
representations, V will consist of 4-tuples (prefs , π, ω,m), where m is the multiplicity of the
vote, that is, a number of voters of identical preferences, price, and weight that this entry
in V is standing for. m(v) will denote the m value of a v ∈ V . Note that here single entry
in V often represents multiple voters.
This notation will help us speak of bribery problems in a uniform fashion. Note that in
addition to specifying E = (C, V, p, k) we always need to explicitly state what election rule
we are using.
Positive results regarding more demanding bribery problems imply positive results about
weaker ones. For example, if weighted bribery is in P for some election system E then clearly
we have that unweighted bribery is also easy for E . Conversely, hardness results regarding
simpler models imply hardness results about the more involved ones. We often mention
such “implied” results separately if they are interesting (e.g., if an algorithm for a simpler
case provides insights for understanding the more complicated case), but we omit them if
they are not enlightening.
2.3 Reductions and NP-completeness
Before we proceed with the study of bribery, let us briefly review some notions of
computational complexity and some standard NP-complete problems that we will use in
our proofs.
As usual, ‖S‖ denotes the cardinality of the set S. We fix our alphabet to be Σ = {0, 1}
and we assume standard encodings of mathematical entities involved in our problems. In
particular, all integers are represented in binary unless specified otherwise. (See, e.g., Garey
and Johnson’s textbook [GJ79] for a discussion of these issues.) By NP-completeness we as
is standard mean completeness with respect to many-one (polynomial-time) reductions.
Definition 2.1 A ≤pm B (A many-one reduces to B) if there is a polynomial-time
computable function f such that
(∀x ∈ Σ∗)[x ∈ A ⇐⇒ f(x) ∈ B].
In one of our results relating manipulation and bribery we also need disjunctive truth-table
reductions.
Definition 2.2 We say that A ≤pdtt B (A disjunctively truth-table reduces to B) if there is
a polynomial-time procedure that on input x outputs a list of strings y1, . . . , ym such that
x ∈ A if and only if at least one of yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is in B.
Both of the above definitions are standard and commonly used within the field of
complexity theory. Detailed treatment of various reduction types including these can be
found, e.g., in the work of Ladner, Lynch, and Selman [LLS75].
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A standard way of showing that a problem is NP-complete is by proving it is in NP and
reducing some known NP-complete problem to it. The former is easy for most of the bribery
problems that we deal with: If we can compute the winners of the elections in polynomial
time, then we can just nondeterministically guess a bribe and test whether it yields the
desired outcome. For the latter issue we use reductions from either the partition problem
or the exact cover by 3-sets problem (see, e.g., [GJ79,Pap94] for general background on
these problems and on proving NP-completeness).
The problem Partition asks whether it is possible to split a sequence of integers into two
subsequences that have equal sums.
Name: Partition.
Given: A sequence s1, . . . , sn of nonnegative integers satisfying
∑n
i=1 si ≡ 0 (mod 2).
3
Question: Is there a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A si =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}−A si?
To prove our main dichotomy result in Section 4 we need a more restrictive version
of the partition problem. Let s1, . . . , sn be a sequence of nonnegative integers such that∑n
i=1 si ≡ 0 (mod 2). In Partition
′ we assume that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that
(1) si ≥
1
2 + n
n∑
i=1
si
(reminder: footnote 3 of course applies regarding the handling of both
∑n
i=1 si ≡ 0 (mod 2)
and (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})[si ≥
1
2+n
∑n
i=1 si]), and we ask whether there exists an A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
such that
∑
i∈A si =
1
2
∑n
i=1 si. For the sake of completeness we include a proof that
Partition′ remains NP-complete.
Lemma 2.3 Partition′ is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly, Partition′ is in NP. We will show, by a reduction from the standard
partition problem, that Partition′ is also NP-hard.
Let q = s1, . . . , sn be a sequence of nonnegative integers and let 2S =
∑n
i=1 si. First, we
construct a sequence q′ = s′1, o
′
1, . . . , s
′
n, o
′
n of 2n nonnegative integers that has the following
two properties. (1) q′ can be partitioned if and only if q can be. (2) Each partition of q′
splits q′ into two sequences of the same cardinality. We define s′i and o
′
i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as
follows.
s′i = 3
i−1 + 3nsi.
o′i = 3
i−1.
3If for a given input it holds that
Pn
i=1 si 6≡ 0 (mod 2), we consider the input to be “syntactically” illegal
and thus consider that input not to be a member of Partition. For the rest of this paper we assume, when
reducing from Partition to some other problem (Q), that if some “syntactic” constraint is violated by the
input, then our reduction will not do whatever the reduction we give states, but rather will instantly map to
a fixed element of Q. We (often tacitly) make the same assumption—that “syntactically” (by which we mean
both true conditions of syntax and other polynomial-time constraints a problem via the “Given” assumes
apply to its inputs) illegal inputs are not handled via the reduction’s operation on the input’s components,
but rather are mapped to a fixed element of the complement of the set being reduced to.
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Any partition of s′1, o
′
1, . . . , s
′
n, o
′
n splits q
′ into two subsequences that each sum up to S′,
where S′ is defined as
S′ =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(s′i + o
′
i) = 3
nS +
n∑
i=1
3i−1 = 3nS +
3n − 1
2
.
Clearly, any partition of s′1, o
′
1, . . . , s
′
n, o
′
n splits q
′ into two halves such that if s′i belongs to
one then o′i belongs to the other. It is also immediate that q can be partitioned if and only
if q′ can.
To satisfy condition (1) we add a constant to each s′i and o
′
i. Define q̂ to be a sequence
of numbers ŝ1, ô1, . . . , ŝn, ôn such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
ŝi = s
′
i + S
′ and
ôi = o
′
i + S
′.
Clearly, any partition of q′ still is a partition of q̂, since any partition of q′ splits q′ into
two subsequences of the same cardinality. The converse holds because any partition of q̂
has to split it into subsequences that each sum up to Ŝ = S′+nS′ and this is only possible
if each subsequence contains exactly n elements. (A sum of more than n elements would
be greater than (n + 1)S′ and that would be more than the other subsequence could sum
up to.) It remains to show that (1) holds for q̂. This is the case because each ŝi and ôi is
greater than S′ and S′ = 22+2n Ŝ. (Note that sequence q̂ has 2n elements.) Since q̂ can be
computed in polynomial time, the proof is completed. ❑
The exact cover by 3-sets problem (X3C) asks about a way to pick, from a given list,
three-element subsets of some set B so as to cover the whole set without ever introducing
the same element more than once.
Name: X3C.
Given: A set B = {b1, . . . , b3t} and a family of three-element subsets of B, S =
{S1, . . . , Sm}.
Question: Is there a set A ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that ‖A‖ = t and
⋃
i∈A Si = B?
These two problems—Partition and X3C—have been useful tools for proving NP-
completeness of control and manipulation problems, and in this paper we will see that
they are very powerful when used for bribery problems. Specifically, Partition will be very
useful when we are dealing with weighted elections and X3C will be particularly useful in
the unweighted cases.
3 Plurality
In this section we determine the complexity of bribery for plurality-rule elections. Plurality
rule is perhaps the most popular election system in practical use; from the point of view
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of democracy it is very natural and appealing to make a decision that many people prefer.
However, there are also downsides to plurality rule. Plurality rule may slight the voices
of minorities and does not take into account full information about voters’ preferences.
In particular, if there is some candidate that all voters rank as second best and no other
candidate is the top choice of many rankings, it might seem natural to elect this “second
best” person. However, plurality is blind to this. In fact, we will typically view a vote
in plurality rule elections as a vote for a particular candidate, namely, the most preferred
candidate according to the preference order that is the actual vote (for the purposes of
this paper that is the only thing that matters about the voter—though we mention that in
other contexts, such as “control” problems allowing deletion of candidates [BTT92,HHR07a,
HHR07b], the full ordering might be important). The simplicity and widespread use of
plurality rule elections make the results of this section of particular relevance.
The simplest bribery scenario is when the voters are unweighted and each voter is as
expensive to bribe as each other voter. Not surprisingly, bribery is easy in such a setting.
Theorem 3.1 plurality-bribery is in P.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is simple, but we describe it in detail as a simple
introduction to our proofs regarding bribery. We will give a polynomial-time algorithm
that given an instance of bribery E = (C, V, p, k) decides whether it is possible to make p a
winner by bribing at most k voters.
Our algorithm works in the following way. Initially we have bribed zero voters. We
check whether p currently is a winner. If so, we accept. Otherwise, until doing so will
exceed the bribe limit, we pick any current winner, bribe one of his or her voters (recall, as
mentioned earlier in this section, that by “his or her [i.e., the selected winner’s] voters” we
mean those voters having that particular selected winner as their most preferred candidate)
to vote for p, and jump back to testing whether p is a winner. If we reach the bribe limit
(i.e., in the above we have the “until doing so will exceed the bribe limit” break us out of
the loop) without making p a winner then we reject.
If this algorithm accepts then obviously bribery is possible. A simple induction on the
number of the voters being bribed shows that if bribery is possible then the algorithm
accepts. The algorithm works in polynomial time as at most ‖V ‖ bribes suffice to make p
a winner and each of the iterations can be executed in polynomial time. The theorem is
proven. We mention that the same approach clearly also works for the unique case. ❑
The ease of obtaining the above algorithm might fool us into thinking that bribery
within the plurality system is always easy. However, that is not the case.
Theorem 3.2 plurality-weighted-$bribery is NP-complete, even for just two candidates.
Proof. Recall that the nonunique version of the problem is our default case, and so we
are addressing that here.
plurality-weighted-$bribery is in NP: We can guess the voters to bribe and test whether
such a bribe both makes our designated candidate a winner and does not exceed the budget.
It remains to show that the problem is NP-hard.
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To show NP-hardness, we will construct a reduction from Partition. Let s1, . . . , sn be
a sequence of nonnegative integers and let
∑n
i=1 si = 2S. Our goal is to design an election
E = (C, V, p, k) in which p can become a winner by bribery of cost at most k if and only
if there is a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A si = S. We define the election to have two
candidates, p and c, and exactly n voters, v1, . . . , vn, with each vi having both weight and
price equal to si. All voters prefer c to p. The budget k is set to S. We claim that p can
become a winner if and only s1, . . . , sn can be partitioned into two equal-sum groups.
Let us assume that there is a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A si = S. This means
that for each i ∈ A we can bribe vi to vote for p and get for p a total vote weight (in the
natural sense, as was defined in Section 2) of S. This makes p a winner. On the other hand,
assume that p can be made a winner by bribes of total cost at most k = S. The weight of
each voter is equal to his or her price and so p can obtain at most vote weight k = S. In
fact, p must obtain exactly vote weight S, since from our setup it is clear that if p gains
strictly less than vote weight S then c will be the unique winner. This means that there
is a way of picking some voters whose weights sum up to exactly S, and thus the sequence
s1, . . . , sn can be partitioned into two subsequences that each sum up to S.
Our reduction can be carried out in polynomial time and so the proof is complete. This
of course regards our default case, namely the nonunique case. The unique case also follows,
namely, by observing that it is enough to add one voter with weight 1 and price 0 who votes
for p. Then the same arguments as above show that this is a correct reduction. ❑
The above theorems show that bribery is easy in the basic case but becomes intractable
if we allow voters with prices and weights. It is natural to ask which of the additional
features (prices? weights?) is responsible for making the problem difficult. It turns out that
neither of them is the sole reason and that only their combination yields enough power to
make the problem NP-complete.4
Theorem 3.3 Both plurality-$bribery and plurality-weighted-bribery are in P.
Theorem 3.3 is a special case of a result that we prove later (namely, of Theorem 3.8) and
thus, instead of giving the proof, we provide a very informal discussion of polynomial-time
algorithms for both plurality-$bribery and plurality-weighted-bribery.
A direct greedy algorithm, like the one underpinning Theorem 3.1, fails to prove
Theorem 3.3: The problem is that one has to judge whether it is better to bribe voters
who currently prefer one of the winners or to bribe voters with the highest weights (or
lowest prices). (To see that the former may sometime make sense, consider an election in
which a has two weight-4 voters, b has one weight-5 voter, and p has one weight-2 voter.
Bribing one weight-4 voter is a winning bribery but bribing the one weight-5 voter is not.)
We approach Theorem 3.3’s proof as follows. Assume that p will have r votes after the
bribery (or in the weighted case, r vote weight), where r is some number to be specified
later. If this is to make p a winner, we need to make sure that everyone else gets at most r
votes. Thus we carefully choose enough cheapest (heaviest) voters of candidates that defeat
4However, it is interesting to compare this to Theorems 4.8, 4.9, 4.13, and 4.14, which suggest that high
weights are often the feature responsible for making the problem NP-complete.
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p so that after bribing them to vote for p each candidate other than p has at most r votes.
Then we simply have to make sure that p gets at least r votes by bribing the cheapest (the
heaviest) of the remaining voters. If during this process p ever becomes a winner without
exceeding the budget (the bribe limit) then we know that bribery is possible.
How do we pick the value of r? In the case of plurality-$bribery, we can simply run
the above procedure for all possible values of r, i.e., 0 ≤ r ≤ ‖V ‖, and accept exactly if it
succeeds for at least one of them. For plurality-weighted-bribery a slightly trickier approach
works. Namely, it is enough to try all values r that can be obtained as a vote weight of
some candidate (other than p) via bribing some number of his or her heaviest voters. There
are only polynomially many such values and so the whole algorithm works in polynomial
time. The intuition for using such values r is the following: (a) When bribing voters of some
candidate one can always limit oneself to the heaviest ones, and (b) after each successful
bribery there is a value r′ such that p’s vote weight is at most r′, each other candidate’s
vote weight is at most r′, and there is some candidate c 6= p such that c’s vote weight is
exactly r′. Our algorithm, in essence, performs an exhaustive search (within our heavily
limited search space) for such a value r′.
Note that all of the above algorithms assume that we bribe people to vote for p. This
is a reasonable method of bribing if one wants p to become a winner, but it also has
potential real-world downsides: The more people we bribe, the more likely it may be that
the malicious attempts will be detected and will work against p. To minimize the chances
of that happening we might instead bribe voters to vote not for p but for some other
candidate(s). This way p does not get extra votes but might be able to take away enough
from the most popular candidates to become a winner.
Definition 3.4 plurality-weighted-negative-bribery is defined to be the same as plurality-
weighted-bribery, except with the restriction that it is illegal to bribe people to vote for the
designated candidate.
The problem plurality-negative-$bribery is defined analogously. We call this setting
negative-bribery because the motivation of p is not to get votes for him- or herself, but to
take them away from others. Unlike Theorem 3.3, this version of the problem draws a very
sharp line between the complexity of bribing weighted and priced voters.
Theorem 3.5 plurality-weighted-negative-bribery is NP-complete, but plurality-negative-
$bribery is in P.
Proof. We first give a polynomial-time algorithm for plurality-negative-$bribery. Let
E = (C, V, p, k) be the bribery instance we want to solve. We need to make p a winner by
taking votes away from popular candidates and distributing them among the less popular
ones. (The previous sentence said “a winner” since we as usual are addressing the nonunique
case. However, it is clear that a similar approach works for the unique case, i.e., the case
in which the goal is to make p “the winner.”)
We partition the set of all voters into three sets: candidates that defeat p, from whom
votes need to be taken away, candidates that are defeated by p, to whom we can give extra
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votes, and candidates that have the same score as p.
Cabove = {c | c ∈ C, scoreE(c) > scoreE(p)}.
Cbelow = {c | c ∈ C, scoreE(c) < scoreE(p)}.
Cequal = {c | c ∈ C, scoreE(c) = scoreE(p)}.
Since all candidates have the same weight (weight 1) in the current case, plurality-negative-
$bribery, it is not hard to see that if there is some successful negative bribery then there
will be some successful negative bribery that will bribe no voters into or out of Cequal and
that also won’t bribe voters to move within their own “group,” e.g., bribing a voter to shift
from one Cbelow candidate to another. (However, for the weights case, such crazy bribes
are sometimes needed; see footnote 5.) To make sure that p becomes a winner, for each
candidate c ∈ Cabove we need to bribe as many of c’s voters as are needed to reduce his or
her score to at most scoreE(p). Thus, altogether, we need to bribe
∑
c∈Cabove
(scoreE(c) −
scoreE(p)) voters. The number of votes that a candidate c ∈ Cbelow can accept without
preventing p from winning is
∑
c∈Cbelow
(scoreE(p)− scoreE(c)). Thus, it is not hard to see
that a negative bribery is possible exactly if the following inequality holds.
(2)
∑
c∈Cabove
(scoreE(c)− scoreE(p)) ≤
∑
c∈Cbelow
(scoreE(p)− scoreE(c)).
If inequality (2) does not hold then we immediately reject. Otherwise, it remains to check
whether the cost of our negative bribery is within the budget: For every candidate c ∈ Cabove
let bc be the cost of bribing c’s scoreE(c) − scoreE(p) cheapest voters. If it holds that∑
c∈Cabove
bc ≤ k then we accept, as the negative bribery is possible. Otherwise we reject.
Clearly, our algorithm works in polynomial time. The correctness follows from the fact
that we need to make all candidates in Cabove have score at most scoreE(p) and for each
c ∈ Cabove bc is the lowest possible cost of achieving that. Equation (2) guarantees that the
votes taken from candidates in Cabove can be distributed among those in Cbelow without
preventing p from winning.
Now let us turn to showing the NP-hardness of plurality-weighted-negative-bribery. We
must be careful here. In plurality-negative-$bribery, we argued that one could without loss
of generality ignore Cequal, i.e., one never needs to bribe voters into or out of Cequal, and
that we can ignore bribing voters from one candidate in a group (Cbelow, Cequal, and Cabove
are our three groups) to another candidate within the same group. It is not too hard to see
that that claim is false for the weights case, essentially due to the fact that, for example,
members of Cequal or Cbelow can be useful in “making change”—that is, for splitting large
weights into small ones.5 However, in the image of the reduction we are about to construct,
5To see this, consider a setting where candidate Big is the most preferred candidate of one weight-
10 voter and one weight-2 voter, candidate p is the most preferred candidate of one weight-10 voter,
candidate MakeChange is the most preferred candidate of ten weight-1 voters, candidate SmallOne is the
most preferred candidate of one weight-9 voter, candidate SmallTwo is the most preferred candidate of one
weight-9 voter, and the limit on the number of bribes is 3. Cabove = {Big}, Cequal = {p,MakeChange}, and
Cbelow = {SmallOne,SmallTwo}. Note that there is no successful negative bribery that leaves MakeChange
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Cequal will contain only p, and bribing votes to change to p is forbidden by our “negative
setting,” and bribing votes to change away from p clearly is never required for success and
so we have a setting in which Cequal in fact will not play any interesting role. And similarly,
‖Cabove‖ = ‖Cbelow‖ = 1 in the image of our reduction, so we will not have to worry about
any within-a-group bribes.
Now, we start our construction to show the NP-hardness of plurality-weighted-negative-
bribery. In particular, we will construct a reduction from Partition. Let s1, . . . , sn
be a sequence of nonnegative integers. We will design an instance of the plurality-
weighted-negative-bribery such that bribery is possible if and only if s1, . . . , sn can be split
into two parts that sum up to the same value. Let S be such that
∑n
i=1 si = 2S. Our
elections has three candidates: p, c1, and c2, and we have n+ 1 weighted voters:
1. v0 with weight S, whose preferences are p > c1 > c2, and
2. v1, . . . , vn with weights s1, . . . , sn, each with preferences c1 > c2 > p.
We want to make p a winner and we allow ourselves to bribe as many candidates as we
please. (In particular, we set the bribe limit k to n+ 1.)
Note that the only reasonable bribes are the ones that transfer votes of vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
from c1 to c2. (Strictly speaking, v0 could legally be bribed to vote for c1 or c2, but that
can be safely ignored.) If there is a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
(3)
∑
i∈A
si = S,
then we could bribe all voters vi, i ∈ A, to vote for c2 and all candidates would be winners.
On the other hand, if p can end up a winner by a bribery that does not ask anyone to vote
for p, then there is a set A that satisfies Equation (3): p is a winner of our election if and
only if each of c1 and c2 have vote weight exactly S. However, at the beginning c1 holds 2S
vote weight and so a successful bribery needs to transfer exactly S vote weight from c1 to
c2. This is only possible if (3) holds for some A.
To finish the proof, we observe that this reduction can be computed in polynomial
time. ❑
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 state that plurality-weighted-$bribery is NP-complete but any
attempt to make it simpler immediately pushes it back to the realm of P. In fact, the
situation is even more dramatic. In the NP-complete problem plurality-weighted-$bribery
we assume that both prices and weights are encoded in binary. However, if either the prices
or the weights are encoded in unary, then the problem, again, becomes easy. Before we
proceed with a formal proof of this fact, let us discuss the issue in an informal manner.
Why does the unary encoding of either one of the weights or the prices matter? The reason
uninvolved. However, by moving from Big to MakeChange the weight-2 voter, and then by moving one
weight-1 voter to each of SmallOne and SmallTwo from MakeChange , we have a successful negative bribery.
This example uses Cequal to make change, but one can construct similar examples that require one to bribe
votes from one member of Cbelow to another member of Cbelow.
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is that, for example, if the weights are encoded in unary then there trivially are only linearly
many (with respect to the size of the input problem) different total weights of subsets of
voters. Together with some additional tricks this allows us to use dynamic programming to
obtain a solution.
Definition 3.6 plurality-weighted-$briberyunary is defined exactly as is plurality-
weighted-$bribery, except the prices are to be encoded in unary. plurality-weightedunary-
$bribery is plurality-weighted-$bribery except with the weights encoded in unary.
It is tempting to use exactly the same proof approach as the one that we hinted at in
the discussion below Theorem 3.3, i.e., to split the bribery into two parts: demoting others
and promoting p. However, doing so would not be correct. Sometimes the optimal way
of getting the scores of other candidates to be at most at a certain threshold r prevents
one from getting an optimal bribe for the complete problem. Consider elections with two
candidates, c and p, and two voters v1 and v2 such that v1 has both price and weight equal
to 10, and v2 has both price and weight equal to 7. Both v1 and v2 prefer c to p. The
optimal way of getting c down to vote weight at most 10 is by bribing v2. However, at that
point making p a winner requires bribing v1 as well. Yet, bribing just v1 is a cheaper way
of making p a winner and getting c below the 10 threshold.
We will refer to plurality-weighted-$briberyunary as the “unary prices case,” and to
plurality-weightedunary-$bribery as the “unary weights case.” We will now give an overview
of how the algorithm works in the unary prices case, on input E = (C, V, p, k). The unary
weights case can be handled analogously. The main idea is that, using the fact that there are
only linearly many possible prices to be paid, we can argue that there exists a polynomial-
time computable function Heaviest(E,C ′, π, r)—where C ′ will be a subset of the candidates,
π will be an integer price, and r will be an integer threshold—that gives the maximum vote
weight that we can obtain by bribing voters of candidates in C ′ such that
1. the cost of this bribery is at most π,
2. after the bribery every candidate in C ′ has vote weight at most r.
To test whether it is possible to make p a winner by spending at most k dollars, we need
to find a threshold r such that scoreE(p) + Heaviest(E,C − {p}, k, r) ≥ r, i.e., so that the
weight p has originally or via bribed voters is at least as great as the post-bribery weight of
each of the other candidates. Unfortunately, in the case of plurality-weighted-$briberyunary
we cannot just try all thresholds since there may be exponentially many of them. Instead
we use a strategy similar to the one that we hinted at when discussing Theorem 3.3. After
every successful bribery (in elections with at least two candidates) there is some candidate
c 6= p—namely, the candidate(s) other than p with the greatest post-bribery total weight—
that either is a tied-with-p winner or loses only to p. We can use the after-bribery vote
weight of this candidate to be the threshold for the bribery of the voters of all the other
candidates. Of course, we neither know who this candidate is nor what vote weight he or
she would have after a successful bribery. Nonetheless, we can try all candidates c 6= p and
for each such candidate and each possible “sub-budget” b ≤ k can ask what is the maximum
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amount of additional weight we can get for p from bribing c’s voters when allowed to spend
at most b to do so. Then, using the thus obtained threshold, we can bribe the voters of the
rest of the candidates. There are (at most) linearly many candidates and (at most) linearly
many prices so this yields (at most) polynomially many combinations.
Let us now describe how the above plan can be implemented. We no longer limit
ourselves to the unary prices case, but describe both cases in parallel. Let E = (C, V, p, k)
be our input. For each candidate c ∈ C we define
V cE = {v ∈ V | c is the most preferred candidate of v}.
Since we do not have any additional restrictions it only makes sense to bribe voters to
support p. For a given candidate c ∈ C, we can describe our bribing options either as a
function that gives the highest weight of c’s voters we can bribe for b dollars or as a function
that gives the lowest price needed to gain vote weight at least w by bribing c’s voters.
heaviest(E, c, b) = max{ω(U) | U ⊆ V cE and π(U) ≤ b}.
cheapest(E, c,w) = min{π(U) | U ⊆ V cE and ω(U) ≥ w}.
If c is not a candidate in E, these functions are undefined. Here and in the rest of the
proof, we take the max and min of the empty set to be undefined. Note that if c is a
candidate in E, then heaviest(E, c, b) is defined for all b ≥ 0 and cheapest(E, c,w) is defined
for all w ≤ ω(V cE). Also note that heaviest can easily be computed in polynomial time in
the unary prices case and that cheapest can easily be computed in polynomial time in the
unary weights case. In both cases we simply use dynamic programming solutions for the
knapsack problem.6 We can further generalize these functions to give us information about
the best bribes regarding sets of candidates. We define
Heaviest(E,C ′, b, r) = max
{
ω(U)
∣∣∣∣ (U ⊆ ⋃c∈C′ V cE) ∧ (π(U) ≤ b)∧(∀c ∈ C ′)[scorebribed(E,U)(c) ≤ r]
}
, and
Cheapest(E,C ′, w, r) = min
{
π(U)
∣∣∣∣ (U ⊆ ⋃c∈C′ V cE) ∧ (ω(U) ≥ w)∧(∀c ∈ C ′)[scorebribed(E,U)(c) ≤ r]
}
.
If C ′ is not a subset of E’s candidate set, these functions are undefined.
Lemma 3.7 We consider now only elections in which each voter has both a price and a
weight. If prices are encoded in unary then there is an algorithm that computes Heaviest in
polynomial time. If weights are encoded in unary then there is an algorithm that computes
Cheapest in polynomial time.
6The knapsack problem is the following. Given a set of items, each with a price pi and a weight ω, is
it possible to select items with total weight at least W , but without exceeding total price K? It is well
known that the knapsack problem has a polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm if either the
prices are encoded in unary or the weights are encoded in unary. (See [MT90] for background/reference on
the knapsack problem.)
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Proof. Note that in the unary prices case there are only linearly many sub-budgets b for
which we need to compute the value of Heaviest , namely 0 ≤ b ≤ π(V ), and in the unary
weights case there are only linearly many weights w for which we need to evaluate Cheapest ,
namely 0 ≤ w ≤ ω(V ). Using this fact we provide dynamic programming algorithms for
computing both functions. For the base case we have the following: If c is not a candidate
of E, then both our functions are undefined. Otherwise,
Heaviest(E, {c}, b, r) =
{
heaviest(E, c, b) if scoreE(c)− heaviest(E, c, b) ≤ r,
undefined otherwise.
Cheapest(E, {c}, w, r) =
{
cheapest(E, c,w) if scoreE(c)− w ≤ r,
cheapest(E, c, scoreE(c)− r) otherwise.
The following observation allows us to compute Cheapest and Heaviest for larger sets.
We assume that C ′ does not contain c. If any of the candidates in C ′∪{c} are not candidates
of E, then both our functions are undefined. Otherwise,
Heaviest(E,C ′ ∪ {c}, b, r) = max{Heaviest(E,C ′, b′, r) + Heaviest(E, {c}, b − b′, r) |
0 ≤ b′ ≤ b and Heaviest(E,C ′, b′, r) and Heaviest(E, {c}, b − b′, r) are both defined}.
Cheapest (E,C ′ ∪ {c}, w, r) = min{Cheapest (E,C ′, w′, r) + Cheapest(E, {c}, w − w′, r) |
0 ≤ w′ ≤ w and Cheapest (E,C ′, w′, r) and Cheapest(E, {c}, w − w′, r) are both defined}.
Thus, in the unary prices case we can compute Heaviest(E,C ′, b, r) using dynamic
programming in polynomial time. The same applies to Cheapest(E,C ′, w, r) for the unary
weights case. ❑
Theorem 3.8 Both plurality-weighted-$briberyunary and plurality-weightedunary-
$bribery are in P.
Proof. Algorithms for both of the problems are very similar and we will describe only the
(nonunique) unary prices case in detail. We provide the pseudocode for the (nonunique)
unary weights case, but we omit its proof of correctness, which is analogous to the proof
for the unary prices case. We mention in passing that the two unique cases can easily be
obtained as well, via the natural modifications of our algorithm.
Figure 1 shows our procedure for the unary prices case. The idea of the algorithm is
the following: Suppose that there is a set B of voters such that if we bribe all members
of B to vote for p then p becomes a winner. We can assume that for each candidate c,
c’s voters have been bribed optimally, i.e., there is no cheaper way of getting the same (or
greater) vote weight by bribing a different subset of c’s voters. There is some candidate
c that has the most votes among the non-p candidates after bribery. Thus, to decide if
bribery is possible it is enough to test whether there is a candidate c 6= p and a sub-budget
b, 0 ≤ b ≤ k, such that after bribing c’s voters optimally, spending b dollars, it is still
possible to bribe (without overall exceeding the budget) voters of the other candidates in
such a way that
1. each candidate ends up with vote weight not higher than that of c, and
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procedure UnaryPricesBribery(E = (C, V, p, k))
begin
C ′ = C − {p};
if k ≥ π(V ) then
return(accept);
for c ∈ C ′ do
for b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ k do
begin
w′ = heaviest(E, c, b);
r = scoreE(c)− w
′;
w = Heaviest(E,C ′ − {c}, k − b, r);
if w is defined and scoreE(p) + w + w
′ ≥ r then
return(accept);
end
return(reject);
end
Figure 1: The main procedure for plurality-weighted-$briberyunary.
2. enough voters can be bribed so that p becomes a winner.
Our algorithm tests exactly if this is the case and accepts if so. (Though its “if-then” line
might at first seem to focus just on having the candidates in C − {c} beat p, note that c’s
post-bribery score is r, so that line handles c also.) By the above reasoning, if bribery is
possible the algorithm accepts. It should also be clear that if the algorithm accepts then
bribery is indeed possible. Since the functions heaviest and Heaviest can be computed
in polynomial time, we have that the whole algorithm runs in polynomial time. Thus,
plurality-weighted-$briberyunary is in P.
An analogous algorithm works for the unary weights case, see Figure 2. The proof of
correctness is analogous to the unary prices case. ❑
Theorem 3.8 is particularly interesting because it says that plurality-weighted-$bribery
will be difficult only if we choose both weights and bribe prices to be high. However, the
prices are set by the voters, and in many cases one could assume that they would set them
to be fairly low, in some sense rendering the bribery problem easy.
Another possible attack on the complexity of plurality-weighted-$bribery is through
approximation algorithms. In fact, using Theorem 3.8, Faliszewski [Fal08] obtained a fully-
polynomial approximation scheme for plurality-weighted-$bribery. We mention in passing
that although many researchers ask about typical-case complexity of practically encountered
NP-complete problems (see [CS06,PR07,EHRS07] for discussions of this issue in the context
of voting problems), it is often difficult to come up with a distribution of inputs that is
both real-world realistic and simple enough to study. On the other hand, proving the
existence of a polynomial-time approximation scheme would be a worst-case result: No
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procedure UnaryWeightsBribery(E = (C, V, p, k))
begin
C ′ = C − {p};
for c ∈ C ′ do
for w′ such that 0 ≤ w′ ≤ ω(V cE) do
begin
b = cheapest(E, c,w′);
r = scoreE(c)− w
′;
b′ = Cheapest (E,C ′ − {c}, r − (scoreE(p) + w′), r);
if b′ is defined and b+ b′ ≤ k then
return(accept);
end
return(reject);
end
Figure 2: The main procedure for plurality-weightedunary-$bribery.
matter how difficult an instance we would be given, we could compute a decent answer.
Recent papers by Brelsford et al. [BFH+08], Faliszewski [Fal08] and Zuckerman, Procaccia,
and Rosenschein [ZPR08] take steps in this interesting direction.
4 Bribery Versus Manipulation, and Two Dichotomy
Theorems
The previous section provided a detailed discussion of the complexity of bribery for plurality
voting. To obtain its results we carefully hand-crafted and altered various algorithms and
reductions. Designing algorithms and reductions for specific bribery problems is certainly
a reasonable approach, but even better would be to find more general tools for establishing
the complexity of bribery in elections. Such general tools would be especially interesting
if they allowed one to inherit results already existent in the literature on election systems.
In this section we implement the above plan by studying relationships between bribery and
manipulation, and by showing how to obtain results using the relationships we find. In the
next section, by studying some ways in which integer programming can be employed to solve
bribery problems we continue this emphasis on exploring flexible tools for establishing the
complexity of bribery. There, using a theorem of Lenstra we show many bribery problems
regarding elections with fixed-size candidate sets to be in P, even when the voters are
succinctly represented.
Manipulation is in flavor somewhat similar to bribery, with the difference that in
manipulation the set of voters who may change their preference lists is specified by the
input. Formally, if E is some election rule then E-manipulation is the following problem
20
(see, e.g., [BTT89a,CSL07]).
Name: E-manipulation.
Given: A set C of candidates, a collection V of voters specified via preference lists, a set S
of manipulative voters (without loss of generality, not including any members of V ),
and a candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the preference lists of the voters in S so that under election
rule E the voters in S ∪ V together choose p as a winner?
Instances of the manipulation problems can be described as tuples (C, V, S, p), where C
is a list of candidates, V is a list of voters (in the same format as in the bribery problems),
S is a list of the manipulative voters, and p is the designated candidate that voters in S
want to be a winner (a unique winner, in the unique case).
Manipulation, just like bribery, comes in many flavors. We may be asked to make p
the unique winner or just a winner, voters may have weights (in which case S is specified
together with weights of voters in S), etc. Bribery can be viewed as manipulation where
the set of manipulators is not fixed in advance and where deciding who to manipulate is
a part of the challenge. Note that to check whether bribery can be successful on a given
input we can simply try all possible manipulations by k voters, where k is the number of
bribes we are willing to allow. In this way, for a fixed k, we can disjunctively truth-table
reduce any bribery problem to the analogous manipulation problem.
Theorem 4.1 Let k be an arbitrary positive integer. Let B be any of our bribery problems,
but with the following constraints: Voters have no prices (i.e., we do not consider $bribery
problems) and bribing more than k voters is forbidden. LetM be the analogous manipulation
problem, i.e., the manipulation problem for the same election system, with weighted voters
if B allows that, allowing the manipulating set to contain any number of voters between 0
and k. Then it holds that B ≤pdtt M.
Proof. To show that B ≤pdtt M we need to give a polynomial-time procedure that for an
input x outputs a list of strings y1, . . . , ym such that x ∈ B if and only if at least one of yi,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, is in M. We now describe such a procedure.
Let x be the input string. We first check whether x can be parsed as an instance of B
(reminder: that is, that x meets the syntactic constraints of B). If not then we output an
empty list and terminate; otherwise we decode V , the voter set, and k′ ≤ k, the maximum
number of bribes we can use, from the string x. For every subset W of at most k′ elements
(we say “at most k′” rather than “exactly k′” simply because of the possibility that k′ ≥ ‖V ‖;
one could alternatively focus simply on “exactly min(k′, ‖V ‖)”) of V we form an instance
of the manipulation problem with voter set V −W and manipulating set equal to W . After
we go through all at-most-k′-element subsets we output the list of all the manipulation
instances that we formed.
This procedure clearly works in polynomial time as there are at most
(‖V ‖
k
)
= O(‖V ‖k)
sets to test and we can form instances of manipulation in polynomial time. If any of the
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manipulation instances we output is in M then bribery is possible; it is enough to bribe
exactly the voters selected for the manipulating group. On the other hand, if bribery is
possible, then at least one of the instances we output belongs to M, namely any one that
includes the voters we would bribe. ❑
While simple, this result is still powerful enough to allow the inheritance of some results
from previous papers. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] discuss manipulation by single
voters and Theorem 4.1 translates their results to the bribery case. In particular, this
translation says that bribery for k = 1 is in P for plurality, Borda count, and many other
systems.
Can we strengthen Theorem 4.1 from constant-bounded bribery to general bribery? The
answer is no: There are election systems for which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation
is in P. In particular, manipulation for approval voting (both in the weighted and the
unweighted case) is in P for any size of manipulating set: The manipulating group simply
approves just of their favorite candidate and nobody else.7 However, by the following
theorem, bribery for approval voting is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.2 approval-bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly, approval-bribery is in NP. NP-completeness follows from a reduction
from X3C.
Let B = {b1, . . . , b3t} and let S = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a family of three-element subsets of
B. Without loss of generality, we assume thatm ≥ t; otherwise an exact cover is impossible.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3t, let ℓi be the number of sets Sj that contain bi. On input (B,S) we
construct approval-bribery instance E = (C, V, p, k), where k = t, the set of candidates C
is equal to B ∪ {p}, and we have the following voters.
1. For each Si ∈ S there is a voter vi who approves exactly of the members of Si.
2. For each bi we have m− ℓi + 1 voters who approve only of bi.
3. We have m− t voters who approve only of p.
Note that p gets m − t approvals and that each bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3t, gets m + 1 approvals. We
claim that p can be made a winner by bribing at most t voters if and only if B has an exact
cover by sets in S.
First assume that there is a set A such that ‖A‖ = t and
⋃
i∈A Si = B. To make p a
winner, bribe each vi such that i ∈ A to approve only of p. As a result p gets m approvals
and each bi loses exactly one approval. Thus, all candidates are winners. On the other hand,
assume there is a bribery of at most t voters that makes p a winner. Each bribed voter
contributes at most one additional approval for p. Thus, p will get at most m approvals.
Each candidate in B has m+ 1 approvals, and our bribery needs to take away at least one
approval from each candidate in B. Since we bribe at most t voters, this can only happen
if we bribe t voters vi that correspond to a cover of B.
7Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [PRZ06] in a somewhat different and more flexible setting have
previously noted that approval-manipulation is in P if there is only one manipulator.
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This reduction can be computed in polynomial time. ❑
Of course, when the number of bribes is bounded by some fixed constant then, by
Theorem 4.1, approval-bribery can be solved in polynomial time.
We mention that bribery in approval elections is actually very easy if we look at a
slightly different model. Our bribery problems allow us to completely modify the approval
vector of a voter, but this may be too demanding. A voter might be willing to change some
of his or her approval vector’s entries but not to change it completely.
Definition 4.3 approval-bribery′ is the problem that takes as input a description of an
approval election along with a designated candidate p and a nonnegative integer k, and asks
whether it is possible to make p a winner by at most k entry changes (total) in the approval
vectors.
approval-$bribery′ is defined analogously, but with the extra twist that now changing
each entry of an approval vector may have a different price.
Having different prices for flipping different entries in approval-$bribery′ models the
possibility that a voter might be more willing to change his or her approval of some
candidates than of other candidates. These modified problems turn out to be easy. In
fact, they are easy even if we have both weights and prices, provided one of them is encoded
in unary.
Theorem 4.4 Both approval-weighted-$bribery′unary and approval-weightedunary-
$bribery′ are in P.
Proof. The polynomial-time algorithm we provide is based on the observation that in
both approval-weighted-$bribery′unary and approval-weightedunary-$bribery
′ getting vote
weight for the favorite candidate can be (carefully) treated separately from demoting the
other candidates. (This is basically because in approval voting in the bribery′ model costs
are linked to entries in voters’ approval vectors and a candidate’s point total is by weighted
addition, over all the voters, of that candidate’s 0-or-1 entry from that voter.)
We can divide any bribery into two phases: First, we bribe voters to approve of p,
our favorite candidate, and second, we bribe enough voters to decline their approvals of
candidates that still defeat p. There are only polynomially many relevant vote weights that
p may obtain by bribery, so we can try them all.
Let E = (C, V, p, k) be the bribery instance we need to solve. For a candidate c, a price
b, and a subset of voters V ′, we define heaviest(V ′, c, b) to be the highest vote weight of
voters in V ′ whose approval of c can be switched by spending at most b dollars. Similarly,
for a candidate c, vote weight w, and a subset of voters V ′, we define cheapest(V ′, c, w)
to be the lowest price that can switch the approval-of-c of voters in V ′ that have total
weight at least w. In our proof we only use sets V ′ where either all voters approve of c
or all voters disapprove of c. Note that heaviest(V ′, c, b) is defined for all b ≥ 0 and that
cheapest (V ′, c, w) is defined for all w ≤ ω(V ′). As in Section 3, heaviest can easily be
computed in polynomial time in the unary prices case and cheapest can easily be computed
in polynomial time in the unary weights case. In addition, cheapest can be computed in
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procedure UnaryPricesApproval(E = (C, V, p, k))
begin
if k ≥ π(V ) then
return(accept);
V ′ = {v | v ∈ V and v does not approve of p};
for b = 0 to k do
begin
w = heaviest(V ′, p, b);
r = scoreE(p) + w;
k′ = k − b;
for c ∈ C − {p} do
begin
V ′c = {v | v ∈ V and v approves of c};
if scoreE(c) > r then
k′ = k′ − cheapest (V ′c , c, scoreE(c) − r);
end
if k′ ≥ 0 then return(accept);
end
return(reject);
end
Figure 3: The procedure UnaryPricesApproval.
polynomial time in the unary prices case. Note that
cheapest(V ′, c, w) = min{b | heaviest(V ′, c, b) ≥ w}.
Since there are only polynomially many prices to try, this can be done in polynomial time.
Figure 3 gives pseudocode for the procedure UnaryPricesApproval, which decides
approval-weighted-$briberyunary
′. scoreE(c) denotes the number of approvals of candidate
c in election E. The procedure simply tries all relevant weights that p could obtain by
bribery and tests whether it is possible, for any of them, to bring the other candidates
down to vote weight at most that of p without exceeding the budget. The procedure is
correct because of the separation we achieved (as discussed above, and applied within our
proof framework of trying all thresholds) between the issue of bribing voters to approve of
p and the issue of bribing them not to approve of some other candidate. Also, as cheapest
and heaviest are computable in polynomial time, the procedure works in polynomial time.
An analogous procedure decides the unary weights case: Simply change the line “for
b = 0 to k do” to “for w = 0 to ω(V ′) do” and the line “w = heaviest(V ′, p, b)” to
“b = cheapest(V ′, p, w).” ❑
With both prices and weights encoded in binary, approval-weighted-$bribery′ becomes
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NP-complete.
Theorem 4.5 approval-weighted-$bribery′ is NP-complete.
Proof. It is immediate that approval-weighted-$bribery′ is in NP. To show NP-hardness,
we will construct a reduction from Partition. Let s1, . . . , sn be a sequence of nonnegative
integers and let
∑n
i=1 si = 2S. We construct an election E with candidates p and c and
n+ 1 voters, v0, . . . , vn, with the following properties.
1. v0 has weight S, approves only of p, and changing any of v0’s approvals costs 2S + 1.
2. vi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has weight si, approves only of c, changing vi’s approval for p costs
si, and changing vi’s approval for c costs 2S + 1.
We claim that p can be made a winner by a bribery of cost at most S if and only if there
is a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A si = S.
First suppose that p can be made a winner by a bribery of cost at most S. Then we
can only bribe voters v1, . . . , vn to approve of p. In election E, p has S approvals and c
has 2S approvals, so our bribery needs to give p at least S extra approvals. Since changing
vi’s approval of p costs si, and the weight of vi is also si, it follows that p gains exactly S
approvals, and that the weights of the bribed voters in v1, . . . , vn add up to exactly S. This
implies that the sequence s1, . . . , sn can be partitioned into two subsequences that each sum
to S.
On the other hand, assume there is a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A si = S. Then
we can bribe voters vi, i ∈ A, to approve of p. As a result, both p and c will have vote
weight 2S and both of them will be winners. Our reduction can be computed in polynomial
time and thus the theorem is proved. ❑
Which of the above-discussed bribery models for approval is more appropriate depends
on the setting. For example, bribery′ seems more natural when we look at the web and
treat web pages as voting by linking to other pages. It certainly is easier to ask a webmaster
to add/remove a link than to completely redesign the page. We point the reader to a paper
by Faliszewski [Fal08] for further discussion of bribery scenarios similar to bribery′.
After this somewhat lengthy discussion of approval bribery, let us now return to
our central goal of relating bribery and manipulation. In Theorem 4.1 we managed
to disjunctively truth-table reduce a restricted version of bribery to manipulation. The
discussion and theorems that follow show that working in the opposite direction, reducing
manipulation to bribery, which at first might seem more difficult, is in fact more fruitful.
The reason why reducing manipulation to bribery appears to be more difficult is that
bribery allows more freedom to the person interested in affecting the elections. To embed
manipulation within bribery, we have to find some way of expressing the fact that only a
certain group of voters should be bribed (or, at least, expressing the fact that if there is any
successful bribery then there is also one that only bribes the manipulators). We can fairly
easily implement this plan, though at the cost of reducing to a stronger bribery model,
namely bribery with prices.
25
Theorem 4.6 Let M be some manipulation problem and let B be the analogous $bribery
problem (for the same election system). It holds that M≤pm B.
Proof. Let M = (C, V, S, p) be an instance of M. We design an instance B of B such
that B = (C, V ′ ∪ S′, p, 0), where
1. V ′ is equal to V , except that each voter has price 1, and
2. S′ is equal to S, except that each voter has price 0 and some fixed arbitrary preference
list.
Since the bribery budget is set to zero, the only voters that we may possibly bribe are those
in S′. The preference lists of the voters in S′ after any such bribery directly correspond to
a manipulation in M . This reduction can be carried out in polynomial time. ❑
Clearly, Theorem 4.6 holds even for $bribery problems where prices are represented in
unary or are required to come from the set {0, 1}. Theorem 4.6 is very useful as it allows
us to inherit some very powerful results from the theory of manipulation. Hemaspaandra
and Hemaspaandra proved the following dichotomy result (see also [PR07] and [CSL07]).
Theorem 4.7 (Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [HH07]) Let α = (α1, . . . , αm)
be a scoring protocol. If it is not the case that α2 = α3 = · · · = αm, then α-weighted-
manipulation is NP-complete; otherwise, it is in P. This result holds for both the unique
and nonunique variants.
Combining the two above theorems with Theorem 3.2 we can immediately classify the
complexity of weighted-$bribery for all scoring protocols.
Theorem 4.8 For each scoring protocol α = (α1, . . . , αm), if α1 = αm then α-weighted-
$bribery is in P; otherwise it is NP-complete.
Proof. We consider three cases.
1. α1 = · · · = αm.
2. α1 > α2 = · · · = αm.
3. All other settings.
In the first case, α1 = · · · = αm, α-weighted-$bribery is trivially in P as all candidates are
always tied. For the remaining two cases, note that α-weighted-$bribery is clearly in NP.
It remains to show NP-hardness.
In the second case, α1 > α2 = · · · = αm, we can employ the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 shows NP-hardness for (1, 0)-weighted-$bribery. It is easy to see that for all
m ≥ 2 we can pad this reduction with m − 2 candidates that are never ranked first to
obtain NP-hardness for (1,
m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0)-weighted-$bribery. Note that our α describes elections
equivalent to plurality (i.e., a candidate is a winner of an α election if and only if he or she
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would also be a winner of the (1,
m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0) election with the same voters and candidates;
see [HH07, Observation 2.2]). Thus, we get NP-completeness of α-weighted-$bribery for
this case since we do have at least two candidates.
The third case follows by combining Theorem 4.6 with Theorem 4.7. Since α-weighted-
manipulation many-one reduces to α-weighted-$bribery and α-weighted-manipulation is
NP-complete we have that α-weighted-$bribery is NP-hard. This exhausts all cases. ❑
Theorem 4.8 applies to $bribery, but of course it is also interesting to ask what happens
in the case when voters do not have prices. Does bribery remain NP-complete? Can we
express the constraints of bribery without using such a direct embedding as above? The
following dichotomy theorem shows that the answer is “Yes, but in fewer cases.”
Theorem 4.9 For each scoring protocol α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm), if α2 = α3 = · · · = αm then
α-weighted-bribery is in P; otherwise it is NP-complete.
If α2 = α3 = · · ·αm then either the α-weighted-bribery is trivially in P (if α1 =
· · · = αm) or can be solved using the algorithm for plurality-weighted-bribery. The
core of the proof is to show NP-hardness. It would be nice to do so by reducing from
the corresponding manipulation problems (which share the characterization’s boundary
line regarding the “α”s). This seems not to work, but in Lemma 4.11 we construct
such a reduction that has the right properties whenever its inputs satisfy an additional
condition, namely, that the weight of the lightest manipulating voter is at least double
that of the heaviest nonmanipulator. This would suffice if the thus-restricted manipulation
problem were NP-hard. Lemma 4.12 shows that the thus-restricted manipulation problem
is NP-hard. It does so by examining the manipulation-dichotomy proof of Hemaspaandra
and Hemaspaandra [HH07] and noting that if we apply their reduction to Partition′ (see
Section 2.3) rather than to Partition then we can guarantee the restriction mentioned above.
Definition 4.10 By α-weighted-manipulation′ we mean the manipulation problem α-
weighted-manipulation with the restriction that each manipulative voter has weight at
least twice as high as the weight of the heaviest of the nonmanipulative voters. Each
instance where the restriction is violated is considered not to be an element of α-weighted-
manipulation′.
Lemma 4.11 Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol. α-weighted-manipulation
′ ≤pm
α-weighted-bribery.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that αm = 0. If αm 6= 0 then we can
consider the scoring protocol α′ = (α1 − αm, α2 − αm, . . . , αm − αm) instead. Given an
instance M = (C, V, S, p) of the manipulation problem, we construct B = (C, V ′, p, ‖S‖), a
bribery instance, such that there is a successful manipulation within M if and only if there
is a successful bribery within B. We assume that M fulfills α-weighted-manipulation′’s
requirements regarding relative weights of voters in V and S. If not, we output some fixed
B that has no successful briberies.
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The reduction works by constructing V ′ = V ∪ S′, where S′ is the set of voters from S
with a fixed arbitrary preference list that has p as the least preferred candidate. Clearly,
if a manipulation is possible within M then some bribery works for B. We show that the
other direction also holds by arguing that if a successful bribery within B exists, then there
is a successful bribery that affects only voters in S′. This implies that S can be viewed as
being the manipulative group.
Let us assume that there is some way of bribing at most ‖S‖ voters in V ′ so that p
becomes a winner. If all the bribed voters are in S′ then the theorem is proven. Otherwise,
select some bribed voter v ∈ V ′ − S′. By bribing v, p gains at most (α1 + α1) · ω(v) points
over each candidate c 6= p. (The first α1 is because p can get at most α1 additional points
by this bribery, and the second α1 is because c can lose at most α1 votes.) However, if
instead of bribing v we would bribe some voter v′ in S′, p would gain at least α1ω(v
′) points
over each c. (We would bribe v′ to put p as his or her most preferred candidate and shift
all other candidates back.) Since it holds that ω(v′) ≥ 2ω(v), we might just as well bribe
v′ instead of v, and p would still be a winner. Thus, if p can be made a winner, then p can
be made a winner by bribing only voters in S′.
This reduction can easily be computed in polynomial time. ❑
It remains to show that the restricted version of manipulation is NP-complete for all
scoring protocols for which the nonrestricted version is.
Lemma 4.12 If α = (α1, . . . , αm) is a scoring protocol such that it is not the case that
α2 = α3 = · · · = αm, then α-weighted-manipulation
′ is NP-complete.
Proof. Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol such that α2 6= αm. We will
use Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra’s proof of Theorem 4.7 [HH07] to show the NP-
completeness of α-weighted-manipulation′. Clearly, α-weighted-manipulation′ is in NP so
we only need to prove its NP-hardness.
Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra’s proof of Theorem 4.7 [HH07] reduces Partition
(restricted to positive integers) to α-weighted-manipulation. A close inspection of that
proof8 shows that there exist constants c and d ≥ 2 that depend only on α such that for
every sequence of positive integers s1, . . . , sn such that
∑n
i=1 si = 2S, the Hemaspaandra–
Hemaspaandra reduction outputs a manipulation problem that has the following properties.
1. Each nonmanipulative voter has weight at most cS, and
2. the weights of the manipulative voters are ds1, ds2, . . . , dsn.
We will use these facts to provide a reduction from Partition′ to α-weighted-manipulation′.
Our reduction works as follows. Let s1, . . . , sn be the input sequence of nonnegative
integers,
∑n
i=1 si = 2S, such that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that si ≥
2
2+nS. (As per
footnote 3, if these conditions do not hold then we return a fixed string not in α-weighted-
manipulation′.) Without loss of generality, we assume that S > 0, and thus s1, . . . , sn are
positive integers. Let f be the reduction given by the proof of Theorem 4.7 from [HH07].
8We do not repeat that proof here. Interested readers are referred to [HH07].
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We compute f((s1, . . . , sn)) = (C, V, T, p). Reduction f works for general Partition and
so, since we already checked the special properties required by Partition′, it has to work
correctly for our input. That is, s1, . . . , sn can be partitioned if and only if there is a
successful manipulation of (C, V, T, p). Unfortunately, we cannot just output (C, V, T, p)
as it does not necessarily fulfill the condition on voters’ weights. Recall that we have to
ensure that each manipulative voter has weight at least twice as high as the weight of the
heaviest of the nonmanipulative voters. Let smin = min{sj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}. In (C, V, T, p),
the least weight of a voter in T is exactly dsmin, and the highest weight of a voter in V is
at most cS. However, we can split each voter v in V . The weights of the voters who do
not participate in the manipulation are irrelevant as long as the total weight of voters with
each given preference order does not change. Thus, we can replace a voter with high weight
by several other voters with the same preference order but with lower weights. In our case,
we need to make sure that each nonmanipulative voter has at most weight 12dsmin. Since
the heaviest of the nonmanipulative voters has weight at most cS, we need to replace each
voter v ∈ V by at most
(4)
⌈
cS
⌊12dsmin⌋
⌉
voters, each of weight at most 12dsmin. Since d ≥ 2, S > 0, smin is a positive integer, and
2
2+nS ≤ smin, we can bound (4) from above by⌈
cS
⌊12dsmin⌋
⌉
≤
⌈
cS
smin
⌉
≤
⌈
cS
2S
2+n
⌉
=
⌈
c(n+ 2)
2
⌉
,
which is clearly polynomially bounded in n. Thus, the splitting of voters can easily be
performed in polynomial time, and since it does not change the result of manipulation, the
theorem is proven. ❑
The proof of Theorem 4.9 simply combines Lemmas 2.3, 4.11, and 4.12.
Theorem 4.9 shows that bribery within weighted scoring protocols is, in most cases,
difficult. Though weighted bribery in light of Theorem 4.9 is easy for trivial elections (α1 =
αm), plurality, and even plurality’s equivalent clones (all scoring systems with α1 > α2 =
· · · = αm), if the voters are not only weighted but also have prices then (by Theorem 3.2)
bribery also becomes difficult in the case of plurality and plurality’s equivalent clones. It is
interesting to ask whether having voters who have prices but are not weighted also yields a
dichotomy result. As Theorem 4.13 shows, the behavior of scoring protocols with respect
to priced voters is very different than with respect to weighted ones.
Theorem 4.13 Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol. α-$bribery is in P.
Proof. We will give a polynomial-time algorithm for α-$bribery. Let E = (C, V, p, k)
be an instance of the problem. First, observe that by considering scoring protocol α =
(α1, . . . , αm) we, by definition, limit ourselves to a scenario with m candidates, where m is
a fixed constant. This implies that there are only a constant number of different preference
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orders, o1, . . . , om!, that the voters might have. We partition V into sets V1, V2, . . . , Vm!
such that each Vi contains exactly the voters with preference order oi. Some Vi’s might be
empty and each Vi has at most n elements, where n = ‖V ‖.
A bribery within E can be described by giving two sequences of integers, b1, . . . , bm! and
d1, . . . , dm!, such that 0 ≤ bi ≤ ‖Vi‖ and 0 ≤ di ≤ n, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, and
m!∑
i=1
bi =
m!∑
i=1
di.
Each bi says how many voters from Vi we are bribing. It is sufficient to just give the
numbers bi since we want to bribe only the cheapest members of each Vi. After we bribe
these b =
∑m!
i=1 bi voters, we need to decide what preferences to assign to them. This is
described by the sequence d1, . . . , dm!: Each di says how many of the b voters will be assigned
to have preferences oi. Since the voters are indistinguishable, specifying these numbers is
enough.
It remains to observe that there are at most nm! sequences b1, . . . , bm! and there are at
most nm! sequences d1, . . . , dm! for each b. Thus, there are at most n
2(m!) sequences to try
out. For each pair of sequences it is easy to check whether after performing the described
bribery p becomes a winner and whether the budget is not exceeded. Thus, α-$bribery is
in P. ❑
There are a few issues raised by the above proof. The first one is the observation that
the proof essentially works for all elections with a fixed number of candidates (as long as
the outcome of elections does not depend on the order of votes, but only on their values). It
is natural to ask why prices and weights exhibit such differing behavior. One answer is that
in the weighted case the voters retain their individuality—their weights—throughout the
whole process of bribery. On the other hand, in the priced case the voters are disassociated
from their prices as soon as we decide to bribe them. If we decide to bribe a particular
priced voter then we simply need to add his or her price to our total budget, but from then
on the voter is indistinguishable from all the other bribed ones. Precisely this observation
facilitated the proof of Theorem 4.13.
The second issue is the disappointing running time of the algorithm given. While nO(m!)
is a polynomial in our setting, one would certainly prefer to have an algorithm whose time
complexity did not depend on m in this way. In particular, it would be nice to have an
algorithm with running time polynomial in n + m. However, if such an algorithm exists
then P = NP. This follows from the proof of the fact that approval-bribery is NP-complete.
In that proof we showed how to reduce X3C to approval-bribery in such a way that each
voter approves of at most 3 candidates. If there were a polynomial p and an algorithm
that ran in time p(‖C‖ + ‖V ‖) for every scoring protocol α, then we could solve X3C by
reducing it to approval-bribery and then embedding that approval-bribery problem in an
α-bribery problem for some α = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), possibly adding some dummy candidates.
This embedding is straightforward so we do not describe it in detail.
Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol such that it is not the case that α2 =
· · · = αm. By Theorem 4.9 we know that α-weighted-bribery is NP-complete. We also
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know, by Theorem 4.13, that α-$bribery is in P. It clearly holds that α-weighted-$bribery
is NP-complete, but it is interesting to ask whether the NP-completeness of α-weighted-
bribery and α-weighted-$bribery holds because of the possibly exponentially large values
of the weights, or do these problems remain NP-complete even if the weights are encoded
in unary? It turns out, by the following theorem, that high weight values are necessary for
NP-completeness.
Theorem 4.14 Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol. α-weightedunary-$bribery is
in P.
Proof. Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol. The proof of this theorem cashes
in on the same observation as that made in the proof of Theorem 4.13: There are only
finitely many different preference orders, and there are only polynomially many substantially
different ways of bribing.
Let E = (C, V, p, k) be a bribery problem and let o1, . . . , om! be all the different possible
preference orders over C. We partition V into m! disjoint sets V1, . . . , Vm! such that each Vi
contains exactly the voters with preference order oi. A bribery within E can be described
by a sequence of m! vectors bi = (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,m!), 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, such that for each i, j,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, bi,j is a nonnegative integer and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we have
m!∑
j=1
bi,j = ω(Vi).
The interpretation of a vector bi is that voters in Vi can be partitioned into m! sets
Vi,1, . . . , Vi,m! such that ω(Vi,j) = bi,j, with the intention of bribing voters in Vi,j to change
their preference lists to oj (recall that Vi is a multiset, and so of course this is a multiset
partition and the Vi,j’s will be multisets). When i 6= j this bribery has some price, and
when i = j it is for free as nothing really needs to be done. Note that not all vectors are
realizable; not every splitting of vote weight ω(Vi) can be achieved. The rest of this proof is
devoted to developing a method for evaluating whether a given split is possible and what its
minimal cost is. There are only (ω(V )m!)m! ways of selecting vectors b1, . . . , bm! so if we can
test whether a given vector is realizable (and compute the minimal price for its realization),
then we can simply try all sequences of vectors and test whether any of them both makes
p a winner (the winner, in the unique case) and has its total cost fall within the budget.
Let w = (w1, . . . , wm!) be a sequence of nonnegative integers. By V
′
i (w1, . . . , wm!) we
mean the following set of m!-element sequences of subsets of Vi:
V ′i (w) = {(Vi,1, . . . , Vi,m!) | (Vi =
⋃m!
j=1Vi,j) ∧ (∀1 ≤ j ≤ m!)[ω(Vi,j) = wj ]}.
For each w we define
gi(w) =
{
min{ρ | (∃(Vi,1, . . . , Vi,m!) ∈ V
′
i (w))[ρ =
∑
j 6=i π(Vi,j)]} if V
′
i (w) 6= ∅,
∞ otherwise.
That is, gi(w) gives the lowest price for bribing the voters in Vi according to weight vector
(w1, . . . , wm!). We can compute gi(w) in polynomial time using dynamic programming
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techniques. Let us rename the candidates so that Vi = {v1, . . . , vt} and let gi,ℓ(w) be the
same as gi(w) except restricted to voters vℓ, . . . , vt. Thus, gi,1 is exactly gi. Naturally, the
following boundary condition holds for gi,t+1.
gi,t+1(w1, . . . , wm!) =
{
0 if w1 = w2 = · · · = wm! = 0,
∞ otherwise.
We can compute values of gi,ℓ(w1, . . . , wm!) using dynamic programming and the observation
that gi,ℓ(w1, . . . , wm!) is equal to the minimum of the following:
gi,ℓ+1(w1 − ω(vℓ), w2, . . . , wm!) + π(vℓ),
gi,ℓ+1(w1, w2 − ω(vℓ), w3, . . . , wm!) + π(vℓ),
. . .
gi,ℓ+1(w1, . . . , wm!−1, wm! − ω(vℓ)) + π(vℓ), and
gi,ℓ+1(w1, . . . , wi−1, wi − ω(vℓ), wi+1, . . . , wm!).
Note that the last of the values handles the fact that if we bribe vℓ to report preference
order oi then we actually do not need to pay him or her; vℓ already has preference order
oi. Otherwise, we need to decide which of the m! − 1 other preference orders we ask vℓ to
report, and we need to pay for this change. Clearly, using this rule and the above boundary
condition we can compute gi,1(w), and thus gi(w), in time polynomial in ω(V ). Since ω(V )
is polynomial in the size of the input, this completes the proof. ❑
Note that, by Theorem 4.6, it holds that for each scoring protocol α,
α-weightedunary-manipulation ≤
p
m α-weightedunary-$bribery, and as the latter is in P,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.15 For any scoring protocol α, α-weightedunary-manipulation is in P.
Certain scoring protocols have natural generalizations to an arbitrary number of
candidates, e.g., the Borda count or the veto rule. Although our results above do not
formally imply simplicity of bribery for such election systems (as we need a single P
algorithm to work in all cases), such results can often be easily obtained “by hand.” For
example, Theorem 4.9 immediately implies that veto-weighted-bribery is NP-complete even
for 3 candidates. Yet the following result shows that the difficulty of bribery for veto voting
comes purely from the weighted votes.
Theorem 4.16 veto-bribery is in P.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as that of Theorem 3.1. We can
view veto elections as elections in which every voter vetos one candidate, and a candidate
with the least number of vetoes wins. (In the unique case, a candidate is the winner if and
only if no other candidate has as few vetoes as he or she has.)
Thus, given an instance E = (C, V, p, k), we keep on bribing voters that veto p and ask
them to veto a candidate that, at that time, has the least number of vetoes. If after at most
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k bribes p is a winner then we accept; otherwise we reject. A simple inductive argument
shows this is a correct strategy, and the algorithm clearly runs in polynomial time. ❑
We in spirit obtained Theorem 4.9 by reducing (with much work and adjustment) from
manipulation to bribery, for scoring protocols. Will that work in all other settings? The
answer is no; we have designed an artificial voting system where checking manipulability
even by just one voter is NP-complete, but checking bribability is easy.
Theorem 4.17 There exists a voting system E for which manipulation is NP-complete, but
bribery is in P.
Proof. Let A be an NP-complete set and let B ∈ P be such that
1. A = {x ∈ Σ∗ | (∃y ∈ Σ∗)[〈x, y〉 ∈ B]}, and
2. (∀x, y ∈ Σ∗)[〈x, y〉 ∈ B ⇒ |x| = |y|].
Such sets can easily be constructed from any NP-complete set by padding. The idea of the
proof is to embed a verifier for A within the election rule E . We do this in a way that forces
manipulation to solve arbitrary A instances, while allowing bribery to still be easy.
First, we observe that preference lists can be used to encode arbitrary binary strings.
We will use the following encoding. For C a set of candidates, let c1, c2, . . . , cm be those
candidates in lexicographical order. We will view the preference list
ci1 > ci2 > ci3 > · · · > cim
as an encoding of the binary string b1b2 · · · b⌊m/2⌋, where
bj =
{
0 if i2j−1 > i2j ,
1 otherwise.
This encoding is of course not the most efficient one, and a given binary string may have
many preference lists that encode it. However, this encoding is very easy and has the
properties that we need in our construction.
In our reduction, binary strings starting with 1 will encode instances, and binary strings
starting with 0 will encode witnesses. Given this setup, we can describe our election system
E . Let (C, V ) be an election. For each c ∈ C, c is a winner of the election if and only if
‖V ‖ = 3 and
Rule 1: all preference lists encode strings starting with 1 or all preference lists encode
strings starting with 0, or
Rule 2: exactly one preference list encodes a string that starts with 1, say 1x, and at least
one other preference list encodes a string 0y such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ B.
Thus, either all candidates are winners or none of them are winners. Note that testing
whether a candidate c is a winner of an E election can easily be done in polynomial time.
The following polynomial-time algorithm shows how to perform an optimal bribery. This
implies that E-bribery ∈ P.
1. If c is a winner, we do nothing.
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2. Otherwise, if ‖V ‖ 6= 3, then bribery is impossible.
3. Otherwise, if there is exactly one voter whose preference list encodes a string that
starts with 1, then we bribe that voter to encode a string that starts with 0. By
Rule 1, c is a winner of the election.
4. Otherwise, there is exactly one voter whose preference list encodes a string that starts
with 0 and we bribe that voter so that his or her preference list encodes a string that
starts with 1. By Rule 1, c is a winner of the election.
On the other hand, the ability to solve the manipulation problem for E implies the ability
to solve A. We construct a reduction from A to E-manipulation. Given a string x ∈ Σ∗,
we first check whether 〈x, 0|x|〉 ∈ B. If so, then clearly x ∈ A and we output some fixed
member of E-manipulation. Otherwise, we output a manipulation problem with candidates
{1, 2, . . . , 2(|x| + 1)} and three voters, v0, v1, and v2, such that v0’s preference list encodes
1x, v1’s preference list encodes 00
|x|, and v2 is the only manipulative voter. We claim that
candidate 1 can be made a winner if and only if x ∈ A.
Since 〈x, 0|x|〉 6∈ B, the only way in which v2 can make 1 a winner is when v2 encodes
a string 0y such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ B in which case x ∈ A. For the converse, if x ∈ A, there
exists a string y ∈ Σ|x| such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ B. We can encode string 0y as a preference list
over {1, 2, . . . , 2(|x|+1)}, and let this be the preference list for v2. This ensures that 1 is a
winner of the election.
Since this reduction can be computed in polynomial time, and the E-manipulation’s
membership in NP is clear, we have that E-manipulation is NP-complete.
The same result holds for the case of unique winners. In this case we modify E such
that only the lexicographically smallest candidate can win the election and the reduction
will define the distinguished candidate as the lexicographically smallest candidate. ❑
The above election system is not natural, but it does show that unless we restrict our
election rules somehow or prove P = NP, obtaining a general reduction from manipulation
to bribery seems precluded.
5 Succinct Elections
So far we have discussed only nonsuccinct elections—ones where voters with the same
preference lists (and weights, if voters are weighted) are given by listing each of them one
at a time (as if given a stack of ballots). It is also very natural to consider the case where
each preference list has its frequency conveyed via a count (in binary), and we will refer to
this as “succinct” input. The succinct representation is particularly relevant in case when
the number of candidates is bounded by a constant. When there are many candidates, it is
natural to expect that a lot of voters will have preferences that vary in some insignificant
ways. On the other hand, if there is very few candidates then, naturally, there will be large
numbers of voters with the same preferences, and using succinct representation will save a
lot of space.
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In this section we provide P membership results (and due to our proofs, these in fact each
are even FPT membership results9) regarding bribery in succinctly represented elections
with a fixed number of candidates. Our main tool here is Lenstra’s [Len83] extremely
powerful result that the integer programming feasibility problem is in P if the number of
variables is fixed.
Theorem 5.1 (Lenstra [Len83]) Let k be some fixed nonnegative integer. There is a
polynomial-time algorithm that given an m × k integer matrix A and a vector b ∈ Zm
determines whether
{x ∈ Zk | Ax ≤ b} 6= ∅
holds. That is, integer linear programming is in P for a fixed number of variables.
We mention that Lenstra’s polynomial-time algorithm is not at all attractive practically
speaking. In particular, although the algorithm uses just a linear number of arithmetic
operations on linear-sized integers—and thus it has a theoretically attractive, low-degree
polynomial run-time—the multiplicative constant is very large. To us here this is not a
critical issue since we are mostly interested in polynomial-time computability results and
general tools for obtaining them, rather than in actual optimized or optimal algorithms.
Although Lenstra’s result applies to the integer linear programming problem when the
number of variables is fixed and achieves P-time in that case, in this section we in fact
typically only need the special case of his result in which the number of variables and the
number of constraints are both fixed (and so the only parameter that is changing is the
constants within the constraints).
P membership results regarding succinctly represented elections naturally imply
analogous results for the nonsuccinct representation. To express the fact that succinctness
of representation is optional in such cases, we put the phrase succinct in curly braces in
the names of the problems. For example, if we say that plurality-{succinct}-bribery is in P,
we mean that both plurality-bribery and plurality-succinct-bribery are in P. (By the way,
Theorem 3.1, by a similar but more careful algorithm than the one in its proof also holds
for the succinct case.)
9Regarding the natural issue of which P results can be strengthened to being FPT results, we mention
in passing that every P membership result of this section is clearly (although implicitly), via its proof,
even an FPT membership result. (A problem with some parameter j is in FPT, a class capturing the
notion of being fixed-parameter tractable, if there exists an algorithm whose running time on instances of
size n is bounded by f(j)nO(1), where f is some function depending only on j (see [Nie06] for detailed
coverage of parameterized complexity).) Essentially, this is because Lenstra’s method is well known to use a
linear number of arithmetic operations on linear-sized variables ([Len83], see also [Dow03,Nie02]). Although
the fact that some voting problems are in FPT is implicit in the seminal work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT89b] (see, e.g., [CFRS07,Bet07]), we mention that Christian et al. [CFRS07, Section 4], which
itself has a bribery-like flavor to its results, explicitly addresses the issue of FPT, in particular mentioning
that it is well known that the (nonsuccinct) winner and score problems for Kemeny and Dodgson are in
FPT, and we are indebted to an earlier version of their paper as it motivated us to here mention that this
section’s P results are FPT results. Among the other papers addressing FPT results for election problems
(although not regarding bribery problems), we mention as examples the work of Betzler et al. [BFG+08] on
Kemeny voting and of Faliszewski et al. [FHHR08] on Llull and Copeland voting.
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Before we proceed with the results, let us introduce some notation. Throughout this
section we assume that all bribery problems that we are dealing with have exactly m
candidates, where m is some arbitrary fixed constant. Thus, if E = (C, V, p, k) is a bribery
problem then we may assume that C = {1, . . . ,m}, and that o1, o2, . . . , om! are all the
possible preference orders over C. Given a set of voters V , by Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we mean the
set of voters v ∈ V that have preference order oi. For a given i, we define wh(c, i) to be
the index of candidate c within preferences oi (informally, where is c in oi). This notation
is assumed in each of the proofs of this section.
Using the integer programming approach we obtain polynomial-time algorithms for
bribery under scoring protocols in both the succinct and the nonsuccinct cases. The same
approach yields a similar result for manipulation. (The nonsuccinct case for manipulation
was already obtained by Conitzer and Sandholm [CSL07].)
Theorem 5.2 For every scoring protocol α = (α1, . . . , αm), both α-{succinct}-bribery and
α-{succinct}-manipulation are in P.
Proof. Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol and let E = (C, V, p, k) be the bribery
problem we want to solve, where C = {1, . . . ,m}. A bribery can be described by providing
numbers si,j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, saying how many people should switch from preference order oi
to preference order oj. (The values si,i simply say how many voters with preference order
oi should not switch to anything else. And we do allow superfluous exchanging, e.g., it is
legal, even when i 6= j, to have both si,j and sj,i be strictly greater than zero. However,
note that in this proof, for example, if there is a solution where that happens then there
will be another solution in which it holds that, for each i 6= j, at least one of si,j and sj,i is
zero.) We may express by an integer program the fact that the si,j’s describe a successful
bribery, and we do so as follows. Here, our variables, the si,j’s, are required to be integers.
We have (m!)2 such variables. Our constants are k, α1, α2, . . . , αm, ‖V1‖, ‖V2‖, . . . , ‖Vm!‖.
1. The number of bribed voters has to be nonnegative. For all i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, we
have
si,j ≥ 0.
2. We cannot bribe more voters with a given preference than there are. For each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we have the constraint (keeping in mind that the si,i’s pick up any
leftover, thus we state this as an equality)
m!∑
j=1
si,j = ‖Vi‖.
3. Altogether, we can only bribe at most k people.
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
si,j −
m!∑
ℓ=1
sℓ,ℓ ≤ k.
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4. The score of p is at least as high as anybody else’s. For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we have
a constraint that says that candidate k does not defeat p:
m!∑
j=1
αwh(p,j)
(
m!∑
i=1
si,j
)
≥
m!∑
j=1
αwh(k,j)
(
m!∑
i=1
si,j
)
.
We have a constant number of variables, (m!)2, and a constant number of constraints.
(Of course, on the other hand the size of some of our integer linear program’s “constants”—
in particular k, ‖V1‖, . . . , ‖Vm!‖—may increase with the number of voters.) Thus using
Lenstra’s algorithm we can in polynomial time test whether the above set of constrains can
be satisfied by some legal si,j’s. It is clear that these constraints can be satisfied if and
only if there is a bribery of at most k voters that leads to making p a winner. Also, note
that to make this program test whether p can become a unique winner we simply make the
inequalities in the final set of constraints strict.
The case of manipulation can be proved very similarly, only that we would have variables
si that would say how many of the manipulators decide to report preference order oi. We
omit the detailed description as it is clear given the above. ❑
The power of the integer programming approach is not limited to the case of scoring
protocols. In fact, the seminal paper of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] shows that
applying this method to computing the Dodgson score in nonsuccinct elections with a fixed
number of candidates yields a polynomial-time score algorithm (and though Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] did not address the issue of succinct elections, one can see that
there too this method works perfectly).10 A similar program can be used to compute the
scores within Young elections. Let us recall the definition of both Dodgson and Young
scores.
Definition 5.3 Given a set of candidates C and a set of voters V specified via their
preferences, the Dodgson score of a candidate c ∈ C is the minimum number of adjacent
switches within the preferences of voters that make c a Condorcet winner.
The Young score of a candidate c ∈ C is the minimum number of voters that need to be
removed from the elections to make c a Condorcet winner.
Applying the integer programming attack for the case of bribery within Dodgson-like
election systems, i.e., the Dodgson system and the Young system, is more complicated.
These systems involve a more intricate interaction between bribing the voters and then
changing their preferences. For Dodgson elections, after the bribery, we still need to worry
about the adjacent switches within voters’ preference lists that make a particular candidate
a Condorcet winner. For Young elections, we need to consider the voters being removed from
the elections. This interaction seems to be too complicated to be captured by an integer
linear program, but building on the flavor of the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b]
10We mention in passing that some recent work responds to the theoretical complexity of Dodgson scores
from a different direction, namely, by studying the success rate of simple heuristics for the problem [HH].
37
integer programming attack we can achieve the following: Instead of making p a winner,
we can attempt to make p have at most a given Dodgson or Young score.
Theorem 5.4 For each fixed number of candidates, DodgsonScore-{succinct}-bribery is in
P when restricted to that number of candidates.
Proof. Given a nonnegative integer t and a bribery problem instance E = (C, V, p, k)
for Dodgson elections, where C = {1, . . . ,m}, we will give an integer program that tests
whether it is possible to bribe at most k voters in such a way that, after the bribery, p has
Dodgson score at most t. Our program will have only a constant number of variables and a
constant number of constraints. Thus by Lenstra’s algorithm it can be solved in polynomial
time.
The process of bribery has, in the case of Dodgson elections, two phases: a bribery phase
in which we decide how to bribe voters, and a swapping phase in which we (in effect) allow at
most t adjacent swaps to occur. We will model the first phase with integer variables bi,j and
the second phase with integer variables si,j: For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, the interpretation
of bi,j and si,j is as follows.
bi,j – the number of voters with preference order oi who are bribed to report preference
order oj .
si,j – the number of voters who, after the bribery, change their preference order from oi to
oj .
The values bi,i say how many voters with preferences oi are not bribed. The values si,i
say how many voters with preferences oi do not change their preferences. We have these
variables bi,i and si,i as they make our equations neater.
Recall that the Dodgson score is the number of adjacent switches within preference lists
that are needed to make a given candidate a Condorcet winner. However, the variables si,j
talk about much more complicated operations, namely transfers from preference order oi to
preference order oj . For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, define a constant switches i,j which gives
the minimum number of adjacent switches that lead from preference order oi to preference
order oj.
11 For every preference order oi and every two candidates r and q we define
who(r, q, i) to be 1 if r strictly defeats q in the preference order oi and to be −1 otherwise.
who(r, r, i) = −1, but we will never invoke this fact. Our integer linear program has the
following constraints.
1. The number of bribes and switches has to be nonnegative. For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!,
11The astute reader will note that to seek to meet or beat a given score for p under a given amount of
bribery, one would never need to in the Dodgson score calculation invoke any exchanges that do anything
except move p ahead some number of slots. This is true, and thus rather than our (m!)2 variables si,j , one
could define an integer linear program that replaced the si,j ’s with (m!)(m− 1) variables that capture just
such shifting. We define things in the current more general way since the current approach removes the
dependence on a “we can get away with just shifts of this sort” argument of the type just made, and the
current approach also leads to quite simple, uncluttered constraint equations.
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we have
bi,j ≥ 0, and
si,j ≥ 0.
2. We cannot bribe more voters than there are. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we require
m!∑
j=1
bi,j = ‖Vi‖.
3. Altogether, we can bribe at most k people.
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
bi,j −
m!∑
ℓ=1
bℓ,ℓ ≤ k.
4. The number of voters who switch from preference order oi in the swapping phase
needs to be equal to the number of voters who, after the bribery, had preference order
oi. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!,
m!∑
j=1
bj,i =
m!∑
k=1
si,k.
5. After the swapping phase, p is a Condorcet winner. For every q ∈ C − {p},
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
who(p, q , j ) · si,j > 0.
6. The swapping phase involves at most t adjacent switches within preference lists.
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
switches i,j · si,j ≤ t.
Clearly, this program contains a constant number of variables and a constant number
of constraints. Thus in light of Lenstra’s algorithm the theorem is proven. ❑
Theorem 5.5 For each fixed number of candidates, YoungScore-{succinct}-bribery is in P
when restricted to that number of candidates.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5.4. Let t be a nonnegative
integer and let E = (C, V, p, k) be a bribery instance where C = {1, . . . ,m}. We want to
provide an algorithm that tests whether it is possible to ensure that p has Young score at
most t by bribing at most k voters. We will do so by providing an integer linear program.
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The workings of the integer linear program are be divided into two phases: the bribery
phase and the removal phase. The bribery is described by variables bi,j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!,
which say how many people with preferences oi are bribed to have preferences oj . The
removal is described by variables ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, which say how many of the voters who
have preferences oi after the bribery are being removed. To enforce the above, we use the
following constraints:
1. The number of bribes and removals has to be nonnegative. For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!,
we have
bi,j ≥ 0, and
ri ≥ 0.
2. We cannot bribe more voters than there are. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we have
m!∑
j=1
bi,j = ‖Vi‖.
3. Altogether, we can only bribe at most k people.
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
bi,j −
m!∑
ℓ=1
bℓ,ℓ ≤ k.
4. The number of voters with preference order oi who are removed from the election
during the removal phase has to be bounded by the number of voters who after the
bribery have preference order oi. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, we have
ri ≤
m!∑
j=1
bj,i.
5. After the removal phase, p is a Condorcet winner. For every q ∈ C − {p},
m!∑
j=1
((
m!∑
i=1
bi,j
)
− rj
)
· who(p, q , j ) > 0.
6. The removal phase removes at most t voters.
m!∑
i=1
ri ≤ t.
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Clearly, there are a constant number of variables and constraints, so the integer linear
program can be solved using Lenstra’s algorithm in polynomial time. ❑
The above two theorems say that we can test in polynomial time whether a given bribe
suffices to obtain or beat a given Dodgson or Young score. Thus using binary search we
can in fact find the optimal bribe for obtaining a particular score.
The issue of actually making a candidate p a winner (a unique winner, if we are studying
the unique winner case) of Dodgson elections is, as already indicated, much more difficult
and a direct attack using integer linear programming seems to fail. Nonetheless, combining
the integer programming method with a brute-force algorithm resolves the issue for the
nonsuccinct case.
Theorem 5.6 For each fixed number of candidates, Dodgson-bribery, Dodgson-$bribery,
Young-bribery, and Young-$bribery are all in P.
Proof. As in Theorem 4.13, there are only polynomially many briberies we need to check.
For each of them we test whether our favorite candidate becomes a winner, using Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick’s integer linear program for Dodgson score-testing [BTT89b] or a similar
one for Young score-testing. ❑
The above discussions of bribery with respect to Dodgson elections lead to an observation
that a small change in the voting system does allow us to resolve a natural bribery-
related winner problem. Note that bribes allow us to completely change a given voter’s
preference list—and this goes far beyond the switches allowed by Dodgson score-counting.
It is interesting to observe that one can define a Dodgson-like voting system based on bribes:
Instead of counting how many switches are needed to make a given candidate the Condorcet
winner, we count how many bribes (where each bribe is a complete overwrite, at unit cost,
of one voter’s preference list) suffice to guarantee such an outcome. We call this election
system Dodgson′. By the above comments, for a fixed number of candidates computing
winners of Dodgson′ elections can be done in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.7 For each fixed number of candidates, the winner problem for succinct
Dodgson′ elections is in P.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 5.4. For each candidate c we simply need
to binary search for the smallest bribe that makes him or her a Condorcet winner (i.e.,
gives c Dodgson score zero). The winners are those candidates for whom the least number
of bribes is needed. ❑
Clearly, Dodgson′ elects the Condorcet winner whenever one exists, and so in practical
settings it might be more reasonable to use Dodgson′ rather than Dodgson. Nonetheless,
before doing so one should carefully study the properties of the new election system.
Note that even though computing Dodgson′ winner for a fixed number of candidates is
a polynomial-time procedure, this does not immediately imply that the bribery problem is
easy for Dodgson′, and we conjecture that it is not.
In light of the above discussion, it might seem that for Dodgson-like election rules getting
polynomial-time bribery results (in the succinct model) is very difficult using integer linear
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programming. However, this is not always the case. In particular, the following theorem
states that bribery in the Kemeny system is easy if we fix the number of candidates. Recall
that a candidate c is a winner of the Kemeny elections if there exists a preference order oh
that lists c on top and that “agrees” most strongly with the votes. (See Section 2.1.)
Theorem 5.8 For each fixed number of candidates, Kemeny-{succinct}-bribery is in P
when restricted to that number of candidates.
Proof. The proof employs integer linear programming, but this time we need more than
just one program. Very informally put, this is because integer linear programs seemingly
can express only conjunctions, but not disjunctions, and in the case of Kemeny elections
we need to express the fact that at least one of the preference orders that lists our favorite
candidate on top disagrees with the least number of voters’ preferences.12
Let E = (C, V, p, k) be a bribery instance for Kemeny elections, where C = {1, . . . ,m}.
For each preference order oh, 1 ≤ h ≤ m!, such that p is the top candidate in oh, we construct
a separate integer linear program that has a feasible solution if and only if there is a bribery
of at most k candidates after which oh is an ordering that maximizes (compared against all
other orders) the number of agreements with voters’ reported preferences. By agree i,j we
mean the number of agreements between preference orders oi and oj (see Section 2.1).
Let us consider an arbitrary h such that p is the top candidate in preference order oh.
We describe the bribery using variables bi,j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, each saying how many voters
with preference order oi are bribed to have preference order oj . We employ the following
constraints.
1. The number of bribes has to be nonnegative. For each i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m!, we have
bi,j ≥ 0.
2. We cannot bribe more voters than there are. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!,
m!∑
j=1
bi,j = ‖Vi‖.
3. Altogether, we can only bribe at most k people.
m!∑
i=1
m!∑
j=1
bi,j −
m!∑
ℓ=1
bℓ,ℓ ≤ k.
4. Each preference order oℓ disagrees with voters’ preferences at least as many times as
oh. For each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m!, we have
m!∑
i=1
agreei,h
 m!∑
j=1
bj,i
 ≥ m!∑
i=1
agree i,ℓ
 m!∑
j=1
bj,i
 .
12A natural way of expressing this disjunction within a single integer program is to use boolean variables
indicating which preference order we are concentrating on. However, this leads to an integer quadratic
program.
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Clearly, each such integer program has a constant number of constraints and a constant
number of variables. Thus each can be solved separately, using Lenstra’s algorithm, in
polynomial time. And since there are just a constant number—m!—of such integer linear
programs regarding a given input, by m! applications of Lenstra’s algorithm we can solve
all of them. If any one of them has a feasible solution then bribery is possible and otherwise
it is not. ❑
It is interesting to consider which features of Kemeny elections allow us to employ the
above attack, given that the same approach does not seem to work for either Dodgson or
Young elections. One of the reasons is that the universal quantification implicit in Dodgson
and Young elections is over an exponentially large search space, but the quantification in
Kemeny is, in the case of a fixed candidate set, over a fixed number of options.
6 Conclusions
Our paper provides a study of bribery with respect to plurality rule and provides tools and
results regarding many other election systems, such as scoring protocols, approval voting,
and Condorcet-winner based elections. Bribery seems as important an issue as manipulation
and control; our paper addresses this gap in our knowledge about the complexity of voting
systems.
One of the important contributions of this paper is pointing out, by concrete examples,
that NP-completeness results may not guarantee the difficulty of the most natural problem
instances. In particular, Theorem 3.2 says that plurality-weighted-$bribery is NP-complete,
but Theorem 3.8 observes that if either the weights or the prices are small enough, the
problem can be solved efficiently.
Another contribution of this paper is to relate manipulation and bribery, thus making
result transfer from the former to the latter a reasonable line of attack—and one that
is already exploited in spirit in the proof approach of our central dichotomy result
(Theorem 4.9).
As to suggested future work, we believe that studying approximation algorithms for
control (by voter/candidate addition/deletion) and bribery problems currently known to be
NP-complete would be an attractive next step and we point the reader to the recent papers
regarding approximation for manipulation, bribery, and control [Bre07,BFH+08,Fal08,
ZPR08]. It would also be interesting to study the complexity of bribery in other settings,
such as with incomplete information, multiple competing bribers, or more complicated bribe
structures (see [Fal08] for early results on bribery with more involved pricing schemes).
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